continue for a certain length of time
to develop positively. The reasons for this are the newly opened markets of
Eastern Europe, Russia and South East Asia in particular. Countries which
had until now been culturally and politically isolated are now attractive to
foreign investors. Care will have to be taken that this growth does not give
rise to further "economic turbulence". For reasons of cheap labour in the
East many manufacturers in Western Europe and America are turning towards
Asia. In 1995 this caused much unrest amongst the German trade unions and
was one of the main factors for concern voiced at the congress of German
Social Democrats in Manheim in autumn of the same year.
There is no doubt that with the democratic development of China and the
smaller dragons within South Eastern Asia and with the opening of the
Eastern European and Russian markets world economic structures will undergo
significant changes. I am almost convinced that many governmental and
private structures will not be able to resist the temptation and will answer
the primitive instincts of competition and profit. This will have two
consequences with serious repercussions in the near future. The first is
that the world economic structures which have existed up to now will have to
undergo significant changes. Secondly, there will be an increased danger of
uncontrollable economic shocks.
Jacques Atalie in his marvellous book "The Millennium" recalls that the
Dutch cities which contributed so much to modern civilisation in the 15th
and 16th centuries declined because of the temptation to spend more than
they earned and to accumulate more debts than they could bear. Is this not,
however, the illness of all modern governments, from the USA to Europe,
Russia and Japan and the horrific debt problems of Brasil, Argentina and
Mexico? Is this not a warning of the potential collapse of the entire
financial system or at least of its entire lack of correspondence to modern
day needs?
Of course, these debts and the mountains of bad debts are not
distributed evenly between all states. The USA and France face huge
problems, Germany and Japan much less and least of all, and practically
non-existent - such countries as China, Indonesia and Southern Korea whose
economies are at the beginning of an undoubted period of ascendency. This
divergence in the positions of countries and nations in the context of
global economic transformations will alter their place and their role in the
world economy. The whole of the 21st century will be a time of economic
levelling if, of course, the world turns its back on the old order and
successfully enters the new civilisation. This process of levelling-out will
at the same time be in conflict with cultural and industrial traditions,
differences in social welfare, macro-economic criteria and standards etc..
The fundamental elements of the plan put forward by the French Prime
Minister, Alain Jupe, in the autumn of 1995 were targetted at France joining
the European Monetary Union and reaching a position level with the other
European states. We can all remember the huge reaction and the large-scale
protests in responce to the threat of losing social benefits and privileges.
Such shocks will be caused with every integration and this is one of the
most fundamental elements of global economic reform. Large scale structural
reforms will take place with the implementation of the common European
currency. The difficulties related to the integration into the EU of Eastern
European countries will be even more difficult. The integration of Russia
will be slow and painful and even more so in the case of the poorly
developed Asian and African states.
However, there is no reasonable alternative. The processes of
integration will continue to developed and will lead eventually to a
large-scale global renewal. For this reason, in my opinion, the change in
the economic roles of the various countries and nations, the globalisation
of financial and commodities markets, the opening of millions of niche
markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, the inadequacy of the world financial
system, the mountain of debts and the re-solution of economic imbalance must
be considered as the collapse of the old and the beginning of the new
economic order. It has taken many nations five hundred years to establish
their national economies. Today they are becoming integrated and this in its
wake will bring about the enormous integration of labour, knowledge and
abilities.
4. THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD
The globalisation of the world has lead to the appearance of new groups
of leaders whose influence and power is many times greater than that of the
majority of politicians. They are not always well-known but they control a
huge portion of the world economy and finances, the global media and
communications and their power is not subject to any serious regulation.
E
very day billions of television viewers watch the leading world news
stories. Almost every day somewhere in the world there are elections or
other important political events. The politicians are presented or present
themselves as the most important decision makers. This was the case in the
20th century. With the demise of many monarchies politicians have become the
heroes and the undisputed leaders of the world. Is this still really the
case today?
Yes, but only superficially. Since with the consolidation of the global
world, the opening-up of societies and the embracing of the international
market there are new territories for world domination. Someone had to come
in to take control of international, economic, cultural and media business.
Someone who would not be limited by national boundaries and who had to have
enough money. These were the global businessmen.
At the beginning of the century, the trans-national businessmen were
mainly colonisers. Today they are legally in control of 80% of world trade,
about the same amount of technology and about 1/3 of world manufacturing.
The number and the influence of the transnational corporations is constantly
on the increase. Their leaders account for the major part of the new
economic elite of the world whose power is now unequalled. Who can predict
in what part of the world it is most profitable to manufacture a certain
type of item? Who can invest enormous sums into science and technology in
the aims of breaking into a market? Who can transfer billions of dollars
from one end of the world to the other in a matter of hours? Only they can -
the newly emerging leaders of the modern world.
Almost no-one stands above the international business leaders. They
control international technological and information exchange. They own the
majority of the satellites used for relaying television programmes. They
also own the global information and television networks. What is more
important, the leaders of the trans-national corporations are constantly
expanding their power. Now they want free, open markets, the removal of all
state limitations and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. On the
other hand the world economic leaders want more dialogue with each other.
How can they devide their spheres of influence? Where will they direct their
investment resources? Where and what markets and what to aim for? The common
objective uniting these new leaders is the removal of all state barriers to
their eventual domination of the world. If they persist at their present
rate to expand the international and industrial corporations within 20-30
years they will have succeeded in dominating practically the entire area of
international trade, and they will have achieved a monopoly of world
communications and distribution of technology.
Ted Turner and CNN, Rupert Murdoch and his media empire and even the
smaller press magnates such as M.Ringer in Switzerland today have much
greater influence over people than the presidents of the majority of
countries in the world. While in the context of individual national states
it is possible to speak of anti-monopoly legislation, in international
business "everything is permitted". If things continue to develop as they
have been doing up to now, within 15-20 years we will be faced with
extremely complex problems.
The media are little concerned with the new leaders of the world. Only
a handful of the great financial players find their way into the television
studios: owners of banks and financial companies who control the movements
of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. Quietly but unerringly they are
creating a power, more powerful than any government and which creates its
own rules of its own game. The leaders of the world financial capital can
influence exchange rates and pour in funds from all corners of the earth.
Very often they are so influential in world economics that they can compel
national governments, including the great powers, to play along with them
and take the relevant decisions.
This is so incongruous! These new integrational economic structures
appear completely to lack any form of political regulation or at the best
have only some sort of political facade. This is one of the reasons why
global relations have been so undeviatingly infiltrated by the mafia with
enormous sums of money from drugs, prostitution, currency speculation and so
on. This is also why the citizens of the world are becoming more and more
dependent on the transnational economic elite, rather than the politicians
they have elected.
If rules are not brought into this international game, if the world
does not establish institutions for their regulation and control, if
policies towards the poorly developed nations are not changed, then very
soon the world financial elite will begin to rule world development alone.
This is the greatest contradiction used by the hidden leaders - while
economic and cultural life is becoming more and more internationalised and
globalised, governments are remaining nationally limited. People see them as
weak and helpless in the face of events. I am far from the thought that the
leaders of the world corporations are bad people or that they ought to be
proclaimed enemies and proponents of imperialism. The world cannot develop
without them but if things remain as they are, the positive role of the
transnational companies as the driving force in the world might be
undermined.
When I speak of chaos and disorder and the unsatisfactory regulation of
the world, I mean categorically the inadequacy of the international economic
infrastructure and the lack of of sufficient international political and
legal regulatory bodies. Such a situation hides many dangers for humanity:
unregulated financial operations, unregulated monopolisation, international
mafia, the danger of periodical crises. What is more important: the greater
the share of transnational companies in world production the more countries
will open up to one another, the longer there is an absence of global rules
to the game, the greater will be the danger of an increase in serious
crises.
5 THE MARCH OF THE POOR
During the blazing summer of the 1985 in Hungary, a tanker lorry was
stopped on a motorway. The tanker was filled with the corpses of Asians
travelling secretly to Western Europe. They had died of suffocation and heat
exhaustion in their flight from poverty to salvation. Every year millions of
citizens from the poorly developed countries set their sights on the rich
countries of the West, using all possible legal and illegal means. Their
march continues...
T
he politicians and their supporters in the most developed nations of
the world can recline in complete, blissful peace. They have complete
information on the condition of the poor, but they have neither experienced
their problems, not demonstrate any particular desire to help them. It is
difficult, very difficult, when you live in Zurich, Cannes, Barcelona or
Salzburg to believe that at the moment when you are giving a piece of meat
to your dog, somewhere in the world tens of thousands of children are
suffering from hunger and illnesses connected with hunger.
One of my friends, a member of the French parliament, told me recently,
"There has always been inequality between nations and humanity is used to
it." I do not agree. Despite the eternal inequalities between the developed
and underdeveloped, during the past 20 or 30 years something has taken place
which has radically changed and will continually the position of the
under-developed nations.
Thanks to world media and, in particular, to television for the first
time they have become aware of how really poor they are. 20 or 30 or even 50
years ago the citizens of India, Bangladesh, Congo or Ruanda were really
unaware of the huge difference in the living standards between their
countries and the most developed nations of the world. If they did know,
this was not common knowledge. The situation was more or less similar in
Eastern Europe and Russia where poverty and the reaction of the poor led to
the acceptance of social utopias and their elevation into official state
religions.
Globalisation brings peoples closer but also gives rise to new concerns
about inequalities. Via the medium of television and other means of
communication, people around the whole world have become aware of the
enormous differences in ways of life and the enormous injustices existing in
the world. This is a new phenomenon and if it persist then it will give rise
to a wave of reactions from the poorer nations. New means of communications
unite us, make us look at the world as a global village, but this openness
runs the risk of creating new conflicts arising from imbalance.
The largest and most compact populations of poor people (according to
the criteria of the UN on poverty) exist in Southern Asia - about 550
million people. 130-140 million poor people live in Eastern Asia and no
fewer than 220-230 million in the Middle East and North Africa. About 260
million live in sub-Saharan Africa and about 100 million in Latin America.
In addition, there are about 200 million poor people in the industrialised
countries.
The gap between the rich and the poor is dismaying. The twenty richest
nations in the world produce a GNP per head of population of between 16,600
(Australia) and 33,500 (Switzerland) USD. The twenty poorest nations,
according to the same criteria, vary between 72 USD (Mozambique) and 261
(Ruanda)[26]. This enormous difference cannot be resolved using
conventional methods.
Nevertheless, if we are to take the market and international
corporation as the only means of salvation, this would mean that the
technological, financial and social gap between the poor and the rich
countries would become even wider. This has been seen in the last 30-40
years. Even now the gap between the poor and the rich countries and people
is self-perpetuating. This is one of the most convincing signs of the crisis
of modern world structures.
Humanity undoubtedly is to blame for such a state in Mozambique,
Tanzania, Bangladesh, Laos, Vietnam, Ethiopia and other less developed
countries. They were all until recently former colonies of the most
developed nations and many of their priceless historical and cultural
artifacts can be seen in museums and private collections in Paris, London,
New York and Geneva. They have all experienced bitter armed struggles and
periods of instability. Measures taken by the UN and other world
organisations to assist the poor have been mainly cosmetic. If these trends
persist and if liberal market illusions are not substituted with something
else, then the hidden dangers may become apparent for all to see. In the
most general terms I refer to this danger as the march of the poor.
One of the most significant manifestations of this condition is the
migration of the poor to the larger towns. Tens of millions of people in
Asia, Africa and South America have left their places of birth to migrate to
the cities, transforming what until were recently small towns into
megapolises consisting of shanty towns and primitive suburbs with
multi-million populations. Despite the efforts of the national governments
this process continues. It has transformed Mexico city, Rio de Janeiro,
Calcutta, Bombay and tens of other cities into places with an enormous,
unmanageable poor population. The poor come to the large cities in search of
food, work and a chance for their children. Perhaps, the most important
reason for this is the desire to reap the benefits of the familiar values of
civilisation. The images on the television screen and mass advertising
campaigns are the most powerful of all magnets, compelling the poor to flee
from their traditional way of life. In all corners of the world where
poverty is a typical phenomenon, this process is continuing. This is
particularly the case in those places where there is no private land
ownership or where land ownership does not bring satisfaction of sufficient
economic results.
The second logical consequence of the march of the poor is emigration
to the most developed countries of the world. In recent decades the 25 most
developed nations have been the object of mass immigration for foreigners.
They enter their "Eldorado" with the help of relatives, false documents,
locked in goods containers and lorries. The liberal dream of the open
society will result in the increase of the flow of the poor looking for work
and peace of mind in the rich countries. In this way the liberalism of
openness will backfire.
Given the present world economic order the richest countries will have
to create stronger barriers to emigration and to build new Iron, Stone and
Wooden curtains between their countries and the rest of the world. I do not
want to be a prophet of doom but such divisions would drag humanity into a
dangerous dimension for human development. Forecasts show that the situation
in the European community will become particulary complex. At the moment in
Germany there are about 4.4 million immigrants, in France - 2.4, in Great
Britain - 1.2 and in Holland about 0.6. In the EU in total there are over 10
million immigrants. According to some calculations if the flow of immigrants
is not limited within the next 5-7 years this number could double. This
march of the poor could have explosive consequences in the developed
countries and at the same time result in a "brain drain" from the poorer,
limiting their chances of improving the standard of living. There is also
the danger of the rich western countries reacting by closing their borders
and isolating themselves. According to the agreement reached in Schengen
which limited the possibilities of many nations to travel within Western
Europe there has been a stream of reactions and disappointment which is
difficult to describe. Many Eastern Europeans are convinced that they have
been deceived by the West and that the Berlin Wall has been reconstructed by
western politicians. The pressure for free access to the rich West will
continue and no administrative barriers appear to be able to stop it.
When speaking of the march of the poor, I also have in mind their
growing tendency towards self-protection and resistance. I am quite sure
that if they do not receive the opportunity to make changes the poor of the
world will unite in search of a new universal ideology. The same reasons
which led to the October revolution in Russia and transformed communism into
the greatest utopia of the 20th century might also create new or re-create
old social views.
Poverty has always given birth and will continue to give birth to
utopian views and dreams of a rapid leap into wealth. The great leap
promised by Mao Tse Tung, the promises made by Khrushchev about the
communist paradise and even Hitler's Third Reich were part of the illusory
belief in the supernatural force of power, human will and violence. The 20th
century was a time of competing utopias. In the new era it will be much more
difficult to achieve similar unity simply because of the influence of the
mass media and economic dependence. However, these means of indirect control
might themselves be powerless. It is unlikely that the poor will look back
to communism. It is more likely that they will look for salvation in
nationalism and in particular in religious fundamentalism and new
totalitarian doctrines. The great danger for the world in the post-cold-war
period may come from the combination of economic problems and the struggle
for cultural survival. If the present world economic order is preserved, in
the next 10-15 years we shall undergo a series of strong economic and social
shocks which will come from the poorer regions. They may take the form of
local wars, the political influence of fundamentalist unions, protest
movements of immigrants in the industrial countries etc.. The other side of
the coin is a possible xenophobic reaction.
Xenophobia in the richest nations and fundamentalism in the poorer are
the two extremes, two major products of the emerging crisis. They are the
catalysts for other conflicts between cultures and religions and between the
ethnic groups in search of a unifying force. Many researchers believe
xenophobia a transitional stage. I, however, believe that it will
periodically re-occur in direct connection with the level of cultural
conflicts within the open world.
Those who are aware of their poverty will aspire to overcome their
problems and to identify their own fate with common ideas, common religions
or new idols and leaders. Today the situation is still transitional. The
poor are desperate rather than unified in a common awareness, but this will
change. The reaction of the poor contributed to the success of the Islamic
fundamentalists in Algeria, the high level of support for the fundamentalist
party in Turkey at the local elections in 1994 and the parliamentary
elections in 1996 and to the consolidation of the regime of the Ayatollahs
in Iran. The march of the poor is a fact and a product simultaneously of
globalisation and the world order which is still inadequate to meet its
demands.
If we accept liberal ideas as sufficient in modern times, this will
lead to a new division of the world, to the appearance of new leaders as
well as Utopias offering protection to the poor of the world. The way in
which we can avoid such a potential outcome lies in world integration, in
the establishment of a new world political and economic order and an
entirely new kind of global society. This is the task which faces us, which
faces the new generation of politicians above all in the industrialised
countries.
Such a task cannot be resolved at summit meetings, like the one in
Copenhagen in March 1995. It is not general discussion or promises of new
charity but profound structural reforms in the world economy which will help
to resolve the problems. This includes specific programmes for the
stimulation of investments in the least developed nations, an increase in
the role of the UN and the restructuring of the activities of the IMF and
the World Bank etc..
Fundamentalism and terrorism, the danger of reestablishing opposition
between political blocs, the appearance of new utopias are all dangers which
express the crisis of the transition to a new world. No-one will be spared:
not the Europeans bathed in the luxury of social welfare, nor the dynamic
USA, nor the over-ambitious Japanese. Realisation of poverty is one of the
most important phenomena which the opening of the world and new
communications has caused. It may lead to more and more violent reactions,
alienation and a hatred for the rich countries and their elites. Did anyone
believe that we would become witness to such senseless acts of terrorism as
the bomb attack in Oklahama city or the Tokyo Metro in 1995. The bomb
attacks in Paris and Lyons carried out by unknown extremists caused grave
concern throughout Europe. These will hardly be the last. This is how it was
in past civilisations when different cultures and different levels of wealth
clashed. The other possibility is a rapid and coordinated change in the
world economic order. The most developed nations and their governments will
have to make a choice between global concern and responsibility or growing
instability for all.
6. A NUMBER OF PESSIMISTIC SCENARIOS
Periods of transition in human development resemble a tunnel with a
number of exits. You can take the most direct route to thelight or enter a
side tunnel with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and
return to where you started from.
T
his book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It does
not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world
in which we are living, this approach is particularly important. Our world
is in a state of transition between two epochs and is instable.The question
is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the conclusions to
this chapter, I believe that the dangers which I have mentioned can be
grouped into three pessimistic scenarios.
I refer to the first of them as the scenario of "long-term
indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be
an extended 20 or 30 year period (perhaps even longer) of geo-political
instability and attempts to expand the positions of the great political
powers. France and Germany would want to establish for themselves a leading
role in Europe, independent of the USA and Russia. The Euro-Atlantic
partnership, the keystone of world politics in the last 50 years might be
threatened. Russia, threatened with the possibilities of becoming isolated
as a result of the expansion of NATO might look to the East to form
alliances. Very soon China might begin to have global ambitions and Japan
will turn its economic power into political ambitions. Given this scenario
the transitional companies will be compelled to play a greater "national
patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force.
Perhaps, you do not believe that this is possible. Take a look at
Bosnia, crippled children, dead and wounded civilians and raped women. Why
did the USA support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the Serbs?
Why at the end of the 20th century can we not put a stop to a senseless
letting of blood. Was it differences between three ethnic groups in this
long-suffering country which lead to the differences between the great
powers or was it the other way around?
There will be a constant series of conflicts on the periphery of the
entire post-Soviet system, in the border regions between Islam and
Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will
not be as bloody. The greatest danger in this scenario is the wave of
national, regional, cultural and religious egoism which it contains. The
"period of long-term indeterminacy" will not end before the advent of the
21st century.
This period might also be called a time of "chaotic policentralism".
Where there will not be a single super power. There will be no clear
international political or financial order. We will be witness to a slow,
contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms
and of the grudging recognition of the rights of others. In the 1970's and
1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a
zone of vital American interests. Today this is being done by a number of
Russian, Greek, Turkish, French and even Japanese politicians. The problem
is that in the majority of cases these zones coincide or overlap. The
Balkans is a typical example of an area which Europeans, Americans and
Russians consider an important region for their interests.
Chaotic policentralism is a state in which there are many centres of
power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict. This disorder
existed at the beginning of the Second Civilisation albeit in different
historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level
that the danger of conflict cannot be avoided. This scenario will be
dominated by local conflicts. International crime will flourish and there
will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers.
My second pessimistic scenario could be called "Back to the bi-polar
world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large
number of politicians, senior figures in the armies and security forces,
retired officers and a number of others still live in the bi-polar world.
Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against
the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the
period of strong-arm politics. There are those in the East who consider
Gorbachev a traitor or an agent of the CIA and dream of the restoration of
the Warsaw Pact and the super power status of Russia. In the West there are
others who advocate the idea of a single world super power in the USA and
the transformation of NATO into a dominant world military force and the
casting out of Russia and China into the back-yard of international
relations.
It would be very easy for these people and their ideas to become
dominant in world politics: for example, the conflict in Bosnia and the
bombing of Serbian targets in September 1995; or the results of the
parliamentary elections in Russia in the same year and the presidential
elections in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and despite
changes of attitude towards Russia, the trust which exists between
politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile.
It is quite possible that the "bi-polar" model of the world could be
restored as a consequence of the conflicts for the fate of Eastern Europe.
On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in this region, not
to be isolated from Europe and to have guarantees for its future. On the
other hand, in the West there is an increase in the influence of those who
desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The Eastern European
countries themselves, with the only possible exception of the socialist
government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and
existence within Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each hasty
move without considering the global consequences could turn the clock back
centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially.
It is a complete illusion to consider Russia a weak country, engrossed
in its own problems. An influential American state department official told
me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time to teach it where it
belongs". I replied that such an idea was imprudent and belonged to the
vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge
resources. And such a suggestion would be sufficient for confrontation to
reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or
naive politicians in Western Europe, isolation of Russia, in my opinion,
does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers.
The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether it should enter the
structures of NATO or not, hides a potential danger for the restoration of
the bi-polar world. However, this will not resolve the matter of the
proportionality of world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from
the European processes and in particular from mainstream world politics, it
will seek its revenge in Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in
Asia. The new Eastern bloc may include Russia, its former Asian republics
and China which very soon will be in a position to increase its world
political role.
The fact that a new bi-polar world will be based on a new combination
of states will not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would only slow
down the processes of world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of
the Third Civilisation and cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions of
people. It would also result in a new spiral of armaments, new ecological
dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians.
The third pessimistic scenario is the "revolution scenario". This is
the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution
of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to
powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons.
Another variation on this scenario is that put forward by the American
researcher Samuel Huntington, that the 21st century will be a century of
wars between civilisations. I shall later reject his theory since I believe
that he is mistaken about the common future of mankind. However, as a
scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary
or local delay to the processes of global reform over a period of about 20
or 30 years, this is entirely possible.
In each of these three "pessimistic" scenarios I can see the
possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of
isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find
support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist regimes or new
utopian doctrines. There is also the real possibility that these three
scenarios might appear in combination. None of them can contribute anything
positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions
of dictators and global messiahs in the 20th century which killed hundreds
of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions
but it cannot be achieved by conventional means. The traditional solutions
with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help.
The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation
of forward to a new civilisation? Back to the restoration of old
contradictions or forwards to their resolution and the formation of new
global structures. It will in no way be easy to change the stereotypes of
thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism
and all the theories and doctrines which supported and continue to support
the waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication systems and
world corporations are the bridge to new forms of imperialism, this will
undoubtedly create a new wave of protective nationalism and regional egoism
based on ethnic or economic factors. This will consequently lead to the
danger of new conflicts and struggles typical of the 20th century - the
century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the century of
imperialism and world wars.
Section two
The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Four
THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS
1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
Every change of epoch is a change of views of the world. The Third
civilisation not only gave birth to but was also served by theories which
are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Today it is clear to all of us
that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by
traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident...
T
he 19th and 20th centuries were a time of intellectual supremacy of
certain theoretical concepts and their numerous variations and
metamorphoses. One of them conquered the minds of the activists of the
French revolution, became enshrined in the American constitution and filled
the hearts of several generations of world intellectuals. The 19th century
was the century of liberalism. Its ideas still form the dream of the free
and the wealthy. The second was the theoretical system of Marxism which
appeared as the defender of the deprived and the poor and was a chance of
hope for those who had no property or education.
Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries did not belong solely to
these two doctrines. The 19th century in varying countries and at varying
times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened absolutism, conservatism
or just reactionary monarchism. On the border between the two centuries a
period of belligerent nationalism and imperialism broke out. The period
between the two world wars saw the strong development of radical ideologies
- communism and fascism and a whole range of statist and semi-statist
doctrines. After the Second World War ideas of the social state (L.Erchard)
and the mixed economy (P.Samuelson) and the national democratic state
(Khrushchev) became popular.
At the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of communism, state
socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism
became the two most powerful driving forces in the world and survived right
up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems as
a result of "democratic socialism" and "state capitalism" or their
"hardening" in the forms of communism or fascism did not reduce their
significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation.
Perhaps, I should mention here why I have not included another
important ideological movement - that of conservatism. The conservatives
have always made a cult out of their loyalty to the traditional structures
of life. The conservative values of "hierarchy, order, authority and
loyalty" have not stood up to the test of time and new realities. Communism
and fascism appear to have been conclusively rejected. Monarchism is only
viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost
their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism and Marxism in
its totalitarian version managed to retain any of their power, at least
until the end of the 1980's.
To what extent, however, can they benefit from the transition between
epochs? Do they answer the needs of the new global realities? Is it
sufficient to say, that liberalism has become a dominant and eternal global
theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism?
Let us look at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long
history going back to the awakening of civil societies, private ownership
and the rights of man. This is its huge historical significance. Hobbs,
Spinosa and Locke in different ways contributed to the creation of liberal
ideas. The geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and
value system. However, the driving force behind the development of
liberalism was Adam Smith. He saw the state and state control as the main
obstacles to the development of the society in which we live. He was in
favour of the free movement of the work force, the abolition of semi-feudal
remnants and the regulation of industry and foreign trade. He was in favour
of the complete removal of all limitations on trade with land and goods.
A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson as well as all their followers advocated
the limitation of the role of the state to the functions of a "night
watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property
and the means of production. "Anarchy plus a constable, freedom with
security" was the ambition of the first major liberals. At the end of the
18th century and the 19th century, liberalism was already playing a
progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the
way to civil rights.
For the liberals freedom alone was the basis of social stability.
Following the traditions of A.Smith and considering himself a devout
follower, Jean Battiste Sei idealised the system of free enterprise in the
conviction that the market alone was sufficient to form balance. According
to Sei's well-known law the crises of over-production are temporary and
economic balance is equivalent to the existence of free market relations.
All classical economic doctrines were developed on the basis of such
fundamental conclusions. A century after the appearance of the economic
views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of
free competition - was consigned to the graveyard. At the end of the 19th
century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis of
capitalism, liberal doctrines began to lose their prestige and influence.
Two world wars in the 20th century and the success of more radical and
totalitarian regimes further limited their influence.
Of course, during the first half of the 20th century, liberal ideas
were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them
followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining all phenomena on the
basis of the laws of subjective logic. Others by default became elementary
apologists of the dominant bourgeois views and yet others became advocates
of the views of Menger and Von Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to
recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature
of the free market were mistaken. The world wars, colonial conflicts,
imperialistic conflicts and totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to the
ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time.
Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground, the tradition of
liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was mainly due to the
hard work of two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig
von Mizes and Friedrich von Haiek. Von Mizes in his "Human Activities"
offers a series of ideas which contribute to the consolidation of the idea
of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is
at the basis of social development. He believes that economic theory and
structure are entirely subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the
state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes
the protection of the rights of hired labour limits freedom and in the
long-term - the natural development of society. He was very critical of
communism and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted many of the
imperfections of the "socialist experiment".
In the 19th century Liberalism was a strongly progressive science. It
destroyed the foundations of absolutism and opened the way to civil and
political freedoms. It was the theoretical crown of laurels of the modern
age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope of
the ordinary citizen, the bourgeois, the craftsman, the small and medium
scale land owner. It was the ideology of the struggle against the
"unjustified privileges" of the aristocrats and monarchs, the ideology of
those who guarantee the power of the bourgeois above the other members of
society. There is no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was
valid - the more widespread the ideas of liberalism, the greater the
authority of the bourgeois class.
Liberalism was a victim of its own success and gave birth to its own
antipathy - Marxism. Someone had to defend the interests of hired labour.
Someone had to bring attention to the plight of a new repressed class with
its own role and problems in society. The freedom of some had turned into
the lack of freedom of others. This was the law of the Third Civilisation,
of the level of progress that had been reached at that moment in the
development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth
to the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which
corresponded to their interests.
Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned
into a class doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing
output and the capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx
was an undisputed theoretician and thinker. He not only developed the ideas
of Smith but turned them in a completely new direction. While J.B. Sei and
John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire"
economics, Marx took things in a new direction. He looked for the
contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later
they would lead to monopolism, class conflicts and the objective
transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his
followers promoted the capitalism of the 19th century and considered it as
an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices
and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system.
At the root of the theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that
one part of society unjustly exploited the other part in contradiction with
the natural rights of man. The struggle for added value, in the opinion of
Marx, was at the root of class division between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariate. Here Marx is in his role as a theoretician and political
revolutionary. He undoubtedly believed that at some time during the process
of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since
competition would lead to centralisation, monopolisation and eventually,
political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin, frequently reiterated
that monopolisation was a logical consequence of competition. These
conclusions by Marx were indisputedy true of the 19th century and a
significant part of the 20th.
In Chapter 23 of the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes to his
most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to come it was to serve
the interests of Lenin and later Stalin as the keystone of "state
socialism". He believed that the processes of natural accumulation of
industrial capital would not only lead to high levels of concentration but
also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill the ideas of
"Laissez Faire" and would set preconditions for the transfer of private
ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will
attain its extreme limit when all the capital invested in it merge into a
single capital. In a given society, this limit will be attained only when
the entire social capital is united in the hands of a single, individual
capitalist or a single group of capitalists."[27] This leads to
the basis thesis which was to be further developed by Lenin - historical
development and progress gradually lead to the increase in the level of
socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production.
This conclusion and the conclusion on the historical role of the
working class and its rights to added value (logically - to the sum of
social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main conclusion was
that private ownership would be destroyed in order to concede its place to
public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over
this issue. Kaustski considered that the priority of Marxist thought was
that the capitalist society would reform itself and that parliamentary
democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his
followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to
raise the flag of the revolutionary struggle for the rights of the poor in
the belief that before capitalism could be transformed into anything else,
inter-imperialistic conflicts would lead to its death and the inevitable
world victory of the proletariate.
This was the main reason why the Marxist tradition divided at the
beginning of the 20th century into two major movements - social democracy
and communism. In both cases, however, they share the same political
doctrines and common theoretical views. Both communism and world social
democracy in the 20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of the
rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and at
the same time the strong regulatory role of the state. Under communism the
role was taken to absurd extreme via the total nationalisation of
production. In social-democracy the role of the state was reduced to its
"natural" dimensions defined by the need for it to protect the interests of
the socially weak.
In 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian
structures Marxism suffered a terrible blow. Of course, it is hardly
possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with Marxism, Marxism
with Stalinism, Maoism or Potism. Marx was complex and occasionally even
contradictory but his name will remain forever in the annals of the history
of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only
some of them are valid for the period in which he lived. Others arouse our
admiration even today. Amongst the latter, I would cite his philosophical
ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler
is correct when he says that to ignore the writings of Marx today is
tantamount to being semi-literate. In my book, I do not reject Marx as a
thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their
politicisation and transformation into dogma.
The globalisation of the world, the universal crisis of the two bloc
system and the appearance of new technology struck Marxist political
practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation of society was in
fact in divergence with the realities of world development. The idea that
capitalist accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised society, to a
single system of production for all workers and to a global proletarian
state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation
of the proletarian state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly,
because such views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms
and the limitation of human creativity.
The Marxist intellectual tradition lost its influence to new
technologies and social developments in the 1970's and 1980's which were at
odds with the structures of state property. The West had begun to overcome
class contradictions and they had reached entirely new levels of social
development. Modern generations are now witnessing the disappearance of the
traditional working class, the appearance of new social groups and new
social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual
discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value and the universal law
on capitalist accumulation - have been overtaken by history. Neither his
views on expropriation by expropriators, nor the struggles of the world
proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment.
This does not mean that the Marxist intellectual tradition has to be
forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of
the world during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted
that the period of free competition would not last long and that it would
lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism
became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th since it offered a true
reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended
their interests. "State socialism" as it was called was the transitional
type of social progress combined with exalted utopian views and violent
methods for attaining them. On the other hand state socialism guaranteed
social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of
people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these
teachings and its influence throughout a large part of the world's
populations in the 19th and 20th century.
The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role
as a balancing force, a bridge between the different classes. In Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa it was a series of generally unsuccessful
experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin in the 1930's, reformed by
Khrushchev and supported by Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao Tse
Tung at the end of the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all
justified under the banner of Marxist ideas and the struggle for a global
communist future.
The historical fate of Marxism reveals one important truth. When a
teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or
when it used simply as a banner, it automatically turns into dogma. Every
attempt at reform in the 1970's and 1980's in Eastern Europe was justified
with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations from the works of
the great leaders could always be found even in the most contradictory
situation. This was absurd. We were obliged at every turn to refer to the
classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned into an compulsory
state religion.
At first glance with the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe liberalism seemed to remain the only gravitational force for
the development of mankind, with no recognition of gratitude to Marx or
Lenin. The semi-statism of the world's social democrats is in crisis,
neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the open world
and modern communications seem to be whispering, "less state intervention,
more freedom". The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek hastily declared after
the death of Marxism that there is nothing left but liberalism. This
illusory triumph found its fullest expression in the work of F.Fukoyama,
"The End of History". In the style of Sei's eternal doctrines of the
"eternal" market balancing force, Fukoyama declared the intransigent
superiority of liberal ideas and subsequently the end of history. He seems
to believe that the market, individualism and the private entrepreneur are
the only quantifiable categories.
For Hegel and now Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of the
unfathomable great future, something which needs to be defined now, despite
the fact that by rights it belongs to future generations. Hegel's
long-dreamed-of modern world will appear at the end of history in the same
way as Fukoyama asserts that the most perfect system is liberal democracy
and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history".
What I cannot accept in these concepts is that history and its
philosophy have a perceivable end and that social schemes and doctrines can
be written in stone for eternity. I prefer to believe that history is
cyclical and that its follows the laws of the great natural systems of the
universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to
this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies
which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history
of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is
no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature.
The explanation seems to suggest that the end of history will be
accompanied by the universal domination of liberalism. The modern world is
colourful and diverse enough to support the belief that a traditional
ideology can transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary
claims that after the collapse of Eastern European totalitarianism and "a
short, sharp shock" liberal doctrines would win the hearts and minds of
Russians, Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty. This did not take place
and because of the inherited economic and cultural realities clearly will
not. However, are the Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea or China
symbols of liberal democracies? Will the countries of Latin America, Asia
and Africa be able to develop in this way? The trends prevalent at the
moment in Western Europe and the USA give no grounds for such "liberal"
optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant
modern processes of globalisation, socialisation or the opening-up of
countries and the mutual interaction of different cultures. The very nature
of private property has changed. It is more socialised and integrated than
at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall
outside the domain of liberalism.
Today's global world is disproportionately developed and traditional
liberalism will hardly be able to change this. If we apply its traditional
ideology universally, the world economy will mutate even further. The
wealthy countries will become even more wealthy and the poor even poorer.
The God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God of poverty for
others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and a revitalisation of some new
form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak.
Today practically no-one has any doubts that classical liberal thought
is part of the glorious past. There is, however, another hypothesis that
after the collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again.
Some modern liberals assert that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher with
their typically liberal policies brought about the collapse of
communism.[28] Others consider that neo-liberalism is but a
rationalist deviation in the era of violence, typical of this century.
"However, if there is any kind of hope for the future of freedom", wrote
John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in the fact that towards the end of
century of political insanity, we are becoming witnesses of a return to the
wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29]
With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my
view that history never repeats itself. We must accept the market, human
rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems
of the modern world or provide a solution to the challenges with which we
are faced? On their own these liberal doctrines are inadequate for the
processes of globalisation. They will as a matter of course lead to the
development of a number of social conflicts for a relatively long time to
come. They will lead to a deformation of world development and a
consolidation of the division of humanity into the rich and the poor. This
will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new
utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a
doctrine of spiritual freedom into a doctrine of the rich. Today it is
hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken away by the
electronic media. In the context of the global world liberal doctrines are
rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and
the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world.
The greatest danger in the context of the global world is that
liberalism will be transformed into a bridge for the domination of cultures
leading to the disappearance of national traditions and entire peoples. In
combination with globalisation market liberalism might easily mutate into
cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological concept of liberalism in the
context of the global world we will be faced with the dangers mentioned in
the previous chapter - chaos and disorder, nationalist and ethnic crises,
the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis
of the Third Civilisation. Both historically and currently the idea of
liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing
is that with such ideas we will primitivise world development and we will
turn globalisation into a bridge for the mechanical imposition of one
culture onto another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia,
the Germanisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary and China and India
simultaneously to imitate the United States and the United Kingdom and so
on. Least of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out
and become ashamed of itself.
Of course, it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore the strengths
of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights, private initiative and property
are things which we have inherited through the centuries and which we will
take with us into the future. The problem is, however, that in the modern
world this is far from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can
explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role
of national states, the appearance and the principles of the global world,
mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation.
These two doctrines appeared during the industrial era, in the
conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of
the Third Civilisation with their inherent structures - nations and nation
states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced
by mankind during the 19th and 20th century. Today, however, all this has
changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern
social structures and the evolution of ownership.
Marx's working class does not exist, there is no class hegemony,
proletarian revolutions are senseless. At the same time the ideal private
owner in the conditions of the intermingling of millions of private
activities and the increase in the dependence of each individual does not
exist. Just like the new technologies did not find their place within the
shell of state bureaucratic "socialist" governments, in the same way the
socialisation of private property and the globalisation of the world have
destroyed the basic values of liberalism.
It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new
ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history and
academic morals. Such attempts are being carried out at the moment stemming
from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule they
serve only to delay the reform process. Their hypocrycy will be quickly
perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself
to indulge in such illusions attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping
reform in Eastern Europe as the revitalisation of socialism. At that time
this was about as far as we were allowed to go. Today, when we are
relatively free it would much more honest to confess that the time of
ready-made ideas has long since passed. New generations have the right to
their own ideas and the logical progress of history does not mean the
acceptance of old cliches. Neither Marxism-Leninism can be successfully
adapted to individualism, the market or private enterprise, nor can
liberalism accept within its own systems the international and internal
associations created by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe
that ideological doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories
about capitalists, theories about workers and peasants. This approach was
suitable in the 19th and 20th centuries when the integration of society was
at a much lower level and social stratification was much more acute and
significant.
I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt
to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves
socialist may carry out anti-socialist politics in support of the major
monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics
in the name of the people and social economic ideas. The comedy of make-up
and disguise will continue for another 10-15 years and maybe more. We will
hear more and more frequently that the changes have only served to confirm
the ideas of Karl Marx and L.Von Mizes. This is, however, to insult these
two great thinkers.
This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can
only give forewarning that the end will come - about that there can be no
doubt. History teaches us that new eras give rise to new ideas. We are now
entering such an era.
2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS
The theory and the practice of liberalism stresses the absolutism of
the individual and private property and hence the monopoly of power of the
strong over the weak. Marxism-Leninism created the total monopoly of the
state by absolutising socialisation and state ownership. I have come to the
conclusion that neither socialisation not autonomisation can be achieved
individually or absolutely...
I
n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an
answer to the question, "Does state socialism justifiably exist?" Why were
its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria?
According to Lenin, "State socialism is based on the socialisation of
capitalist production."[30] By the world "socialisation" Marx,
Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous
social processes. In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from
individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of
primitive labour to slave owning and feudal manufacturing processes, the
development of the factory eventually to reach the large scale monopolies.
Subsequently Marxism-Leninism states that the next step in socialisation
after monopolies is the creation of social ownership or property controlled
by the state itself.
At first glance, this might appear logical: in the stages of its
progress, humanity passes from primitive individual production to enormous
factories and eventually state control within the framework of the entire
society. Marx and Lenin frequently come back to this emphasising that
private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and that it
gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state
control. There is no difference in principle here between Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, Trotski or Mao Tse Tung. They all saw socialisation as a global
process, the basis and pre-condition for the establishment of a world
communist society, of a "single factory for all workers and peasants"
(Lenin). Taking this as the basis and putting to one side (briefly) the
Marxist thesis of the decay of the state, the pioneer politicians of state
socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of
people.
In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example -
the example of natural organisms. Organic cells do not only grow when they
develop (unless they are cancerous) but divide and become autonomous. If
they separate from the main body of cells they die. If larger natural
systems attack their independent development, the cells die or cease to
exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with
autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death.
Similarly, if socialisation and centralisation are viewed as a
unilateral process, they (like cancer cells) will automatically lead to the
mutation of the system. It is true that each subsequent stage of human
development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However,
if this thesis is not further developed, it become transformed into a
rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot
progress meant socialisation, equal to unification, military discipline and
universal obedience to superiors.
This was the very basis for the doctrine of state socialism and the
gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the
1950's the countries of Eastern Europe underwent the total nationalisation
of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via
state regulated homogeneity the differences between village and town,
intellectual and physical work and classes would disappear and that this
would be the basis for subsequent "social homogeneity" and
"nationalisation". This was the model for state socialism. It meant death
for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser extent it
suffocated the diversity of social life. Naturally it also delayed and in
certain circumstances halted social development.
The most important element in my understanding of this matter is that
integration (socialisation) and autonomation are not mutually exclusive but
a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned.
The same can also be said of other pairs of processes such as globalisation
and localisation, integration and disintegration, collectivisation and
individualisation, massification and demassification etc.. However
paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of
processes have developed in parallel and not to the detriment of one
another. Of course, the phases of socialisation and autonomation,
unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously.
At each stage in the development of human history the socialisation of
production replaces a particular level of autonomy and in its turn gives way
to another. The slave owning state socialised the labour of thousands of
slaves and gradually within the very heart of the system new centres of
autonomy began to appear setting the preconditions for the appearances of
colonies and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal
divisions but in its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it
tried to suppress autonomy, the totalitarian regimes could not destroy the
autonomy of social groups and individual people were eventually to destroy
the monopoly of power.
Let us take the elementary example of the single division of labour.
The idea of the socialisation of labour is based on the fact that the
individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the
creation of a final product. Craftsmen are divided from the agricultural
worker, the trader from the craftsman etc.. On the one hand they all are
dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important)
they achieve greater professional autonomy and greater freedom of action.
Similar processes develop in relation to the forms of unified labour -
certain economic units are absorbed up by others while at the same time in
the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more
independent. At a certain stage in their development they divide into
individual autonomous structures. Large companies as General Motors for
example transfer a number of their activities to smaller independent
companies. Each larger production unit is then obliged to autonomise its
internal departments. Moreover, the more developed and bigger the unit is,
the greater the autonomy of its component parts. This process is confirmed
by the decentralisation of management in transnational corporations. In
general the growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of
its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain
stage in its development lead to division and a certain level of
autonomisation.
Thus, the growth in socialisation does not lead to the death of
autonomisation but to its reproduction and change in its forms. The growth
in integration leads to another type of disintegration, globalisation and
another type of localisation etc.. Each human activity is a form of
accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material
and spiritual process leads simultaneously to two effects: firstly, it
concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially
and naturally more independent and autonomous, secondly, this accumulation
leads to millions of new types of manufacturing, economic and social links
between human communities, countries and continents.
If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural units, then
in certain cases their levels of autonomy increase, others decrease and
disappear while yet others appear and continue to develop. In general terms
the socialisation and autonomisation of structures are linked by a complex
series of relations which complement each other at the same time. The main
element is that during the development of the historical processes they
follow a common line of development and growth. Moreover, it is clear that
neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the
richness of human interdependence. Separated from one another, these
categories create deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of the
community is antipathetical to the idea of the objective integrational
processes while forced collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the
same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and
creativity and delay progress.
I am convinced that history will lead us to a combination of the
elements of the individual and the social: the integration of human
activities unify a series of autonomous production processes, countries and
peoples making the world more united and more mutually dependent. At the
same time there will be growth in the social role of the individual,
autonomous groups and ethnic communities. Material accumulation and the
growth in wealth available to civilisations makes man wealthier better
informed and consequently freer and more independent. The more humanity
develops the more this trend will continue. It will be more difficult to
"entrap" such a person within the monopolistic structures of managed
societies.
I, therefore, believe that in global terms it is possible to speak of
the disintegration of historical distances between the individual (private
relations) and the collective (public relations). History has indisputedly
shown that objective integrational processes are ineffective without some
form of administrative compulsion. The higher the level of civilisation
within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society.
3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER
Since the 1960's the technological basis of world manufacturing has
changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day
life that social relations have also changed. One of the best modern
philosophers, A.Toffler, maintains that new technology leads to the
emassification of production. My belief is that the effect is somewhat
different.
I believe that it gives rise to the parallel processes of integration
and disintegration,
massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which
has influenced the world in this extraordinary way.
T
he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration,
globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions.
The first conclusion is that these pairs of categories of historical
development are not antipathies but develop in parallel and are mutually
conditioned. This concept is equivalent to the rejection of utopian liberal
theories of absolute independence and the "purity" of private ownership.
However, this is also a rejection of the notions of a future society as a
world without individualism, internal autonomy, local characteristics and
without economic, political and cultural diversity.
The second conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the
same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral process
(the persistent unification of autonomous units) then this concentration
would lead to centralisation and would lead to the growth in
nationalisation. The view that autonomisation goes hand in hand with
socialisation means that socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process
based on man, the market and private property. Consequently centralisation
has certain permissible limits beyond which it is ineffective and provokes
reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern
world has changed significantly. It is clear that in modern conditions the
borders of the state have undergone considerable changes. The greater the
level of development on the one hand, the more civic society will be
absorbed up by the state - and vice versa.
My third conclusion[31] is that from an international point
of view, socialisation (integration) gives rise to new phenomena connected
firstly with globalisation and secondly with the appearance of increased
local autonomy and localisation. On the one hand, new communications unite
humanity, on the other hand they create national and ethnic self-confidence
leading to the struggle for the survival of nations and cultures as a
reaction to cultural imperialism.
Liberalism and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for
the new realities. Liberal doctrines emphasise individualism, personal
freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on class and collectivism. When
liberalism and Marxism appeared on the historical stage, their one
dimensional nature was to a certain extent entirely understandable. The
liberals defended the rights of free, private entrepreneurs while the
Marxists defended the working class and the poor. The level of
stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that
such doctrines were inevitable. They were a historical necessity and their
mark in history.
It will be interesting to see whether these conclusions will be
confirmed by the modern technological revolution which is apparently taking
shape at the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world
for some time to come.
In a number of his books the famous American philosopher and
futurologist, A.Toffler, concludes that new technologies lead to the
demassification of production. "At the present moment", he writes, "We are
passing from an economy of mass production and mass consumption to what I
would call "the demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of the
great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by
individualised or small scale production. Identical components will be
assembled in more and more individualised end products.
I wanted to draw attention to this thesis not because it is original
but rather that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism
and free trade will triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that the modern
technological revolution will return the demassification of production as
the leading form of economic relations which will in turn mean the collapse
of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their
role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of
free competition. This thesis refutes my own, or to look at it from another
point of view, my theory refutes his. If what I believe is true, that
integration and disintegration and related categories are developing in
parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass production.
It will simply lead to new types of mass production and new types of
demassed activities.
There is no doubt that new computer technology has created work for
hundreds of thousands of people in their homes. The computer revolution had
individualised a huge number of social activities and has elevated the role
of the intellect. However, these technologies have also created millions of
new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of the 1970's
and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would
eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis for such a
presumption was the growth in their relative share of the market. "The
entire economy", writes Toffler, "is becoming demassed."[33] He
gives examples of the thousands of small and medium enterprises in Kiusu,
Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada.
Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the
computer age and biotechnology and their practical and universal
applications a large number of small and medium independent companies have
been created. With the use of a computer it has become possible for many
activities to be carried out individually. The same reasons, however, have
provided stimuli for the large scale manufacturers. Over the past 10-15
years, the mass bankruptcies and collapses of trusts and companies which
many people expected, have not taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen
from the annual American rank listings in the magazine "Fortune", the
leading companies in the world have increased their sales and have
strengthened their positions in the world economy. Over the past ten years
they have increased their position in world trade, manufacturing and
particularly in the area of new technology.[34]
Without doubt the majority of them have changed their structures by
diversifying and delegating their activities to subsidiary companies and
internally autonomous systems. Nevertheless, mass production has not
disappeared. It has simply changed its form. One reason for this is
globalisation and the opening up of new markets for the leading world
companies. Another reason is the production of myriad new forms of
communication - mobile telephones, telephone exchanges, satellites, new
audio and video technology, cable systems etc.. This new technology has
reached unsuspected levels with made enormous profits for their owners. A
similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers -
cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People have begun to travel
more. Together with the construction of the necessary infrastructure,
transport and communications will be the most dynamic growth sectors over
the next 10-20 years.
Who can produce such goods? The small or the medium companies, the
"demassed" producer? On the contrary. This is only within the power of the
large companies, capable of allocating large amounts of money for science,
research and development and personnel training. The globalisation of the
world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to
spread their experience and influence to many countries in the world. Even
in the cases, when a large company subcontracts to thousands and tens of
thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product.
It is difficult to accept the statement that the mass production line
will disappear and that the world is entering into a period of industrial
manufacturing and individualised products. Indeed, modern machinery -
computers, cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and
individualised creativity. However, they all use more and more standard
products - microchips, microcircuits, electronic and mechanical elements
whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production.
The greatest developments in the last 20 years have not lead to the
demassification of production but have autonomised and socialised it. In
other words, from an organisational point of view, these manufacturing
processes have become more autonomous but in social terms they have linked
many more people within new national and international communities. Even
when they are juridically independent, small and medium scale enterprises
have become incorporated into larger companies via a system of industrial
cooperation. While the technology of the Third Civilisation lead to mass
production and large open workshops, new technology has produced a
completely different type of mass production. The integrating effect comes
from the use of goods or services, from the repeated application of
identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world.
Let us take for example the fast-food chain of "MacDonalds" or
"Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these
are symbols of success. The majority of their products are produced
individually or by a small groups of highly qualified specialists. There is
hardly a more individualised profession in the world than the creation of
software programmes. On the other hand, look at the enormous "mass" effect.
For the past ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by
62%. In the USA alone more than 50 million people use Microsoft products.
Today the company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is
essentially a global company.[35]
New technology allows for more autonomy for the individual worker
requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes
more socialised, more integrated into a more general and large scale
national and, frequently, global society. To this extent, more and more
people are becoming dependent on the labour of the individual person and
company but at the same time the level of national and social labour
integration is also developing rapidly.
Whatever example we look at - the manufacture of modern transport,
communications, packaging, commerce, banking, the effect is the same. The
modernisation of these branches requires the parallel growth of
individualism and socialisation. My general conclusion is that the modern
technological revolution has demonstrated the parallel action of both these
processes: autonomisation and integration (socialisation). One of these
processes leads to the demassification of certain types of human activity
and their individualisation, while the other links the manufacturers of
different countries within new types of relations, making them more
"massive" and more international.
Demassification appears through the growth in the role of individual
creative activity, regional and ethnic economic communities, the growth in
the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually
produced and consumed products and services etc.. Massification takes place
through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of
standardised products, the interdependence of common energy and ecosystems,
through the use of common resources, banks, funds and stock exchanges, the
mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture.
My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not
provide us with a limitless number of examples of demassification, but to
show that this phenomenon is only a part of the process. It is not isolated
from the globalisation and massification of world production, or the mass
participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological
dependence. Massification and demassification, globalisation and
localisation, integration and disintegration are paired concepts. Their
modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to
recognise the character of the emerging new civilisation and its political
and economic structures.
4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON
If Toffler believes that the new era will lead to the demassification
of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that
the new era will cause conflicts between civilisations. Are the pogroms of
Sarajevo or the wars in the
Caucuses proof of his conclusion?
T
he processes of integration and autonomisation are taking place on an
international scale. Moreover, international and internal integration are
indivisibly linked processes. The major question is what is the nature of
the world which we are about to enter? Will it be dominated by Western
Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will
triumph? Integration or autonomisation, modernisation or specific national
values?
In response to these problems, S.Huntington in 1993, laid the
foundations for a new, rather pretentious line of discussion. In his
opinion, the "major foundations of conflict in the modern world are not in
the main ideological or economic." They are based on culture and
civilisation. "The clash of civilisations", in the opinion of Huntington,"
will be the last phase in the development of world
conflicts"[36]. Although these ideas are controversial and many
writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely. In 1995
the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in
the 21st Century" at which the former Prime Minister of Poland, Yan
Belietski defended just such a thesis. Many politicians, intellectuals and
journalists throughout the world have similar views.
S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from
the divisions between Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Western culture,
Confucianism, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and a number of other
cultures. In Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a number of leaders
who are determined to struggle for the authority of Orthodoxy. Europe is
divided between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The East-West border of the
united Europe separates Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland and the three Baltic states from the Orthodox nations.
Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and Confucianism and Hinduism
etc..
If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then
we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general
terms, modern academic research after the end of the cold war has been
dominated by two common approaches, each of which either absolutises
integration or autonomy and separatism.
1. Immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, it was
generally accepted that Western culture had triumphed. Western, or to be
more precise, American culture, in the opinion of the editor of the Wall
Street Journal, R.L.Bartley, for better or worse is spreading over the
entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of
many researchers is based on Western culture. They believe that it will
assume dominance of the world and provide as proof the popularity of
football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that
the crowned heads of state from the East are being educated in Harvard and
Berkley.
2. The second point of view belongs to S.Huntington himself.
Integration in his opinion is of no value when faced with the boom of
civilisations. The disappearance of the violence of the bi-polar model led
to a revival of primal cultural identity. Cultural differences and cultural
autonomy instead of ideology became the basis for conflicts. Thus,
Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR
and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world.
By following the logic of the entire book and of my basic theoretical
approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of
thought which were typical of the period between the 17th and 20th
centuries. In my opinion neither Western Culture will be able to dominate
the world categorically, nor will the world become divided into a number of
indigenous cultural civilisations. There is little doubt that after the
collapse of the Berlin wall the old ideologies lost much of their former
significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the
threat of new cold wars, a return to the former state is not entirely
impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures.
Directly after the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking
the lid off long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion was
inevitable. In certain cases this was a manifestation of crushed national
pride, in others this was a struggle for cultural survival, while in yet
other cases this was simply the search for a spiritual foundation for
something to replace totalitarian ideology. How, for example, could the
communists have remained influential after 1989, except by exploiting
nationalism and the struggle against Western influence? Was it not
completely natural for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the Slovaks and
Slovenes to engage in emotional expressions of their long-suppressed
national identities? To this extent all the conflicts along the borders of
the former Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and
repression of cultural identity. It is also the same with the insoluble
problems of ethnic and religious self-identification in Northern Ireland,
Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq) and Quebec as well as many other places in the
world. Nevertheless, Huntington is not correct in his view that modern
ethnic conflicts are the seeds of large-scale conflicts between
civilisations. He absolutises autonomy and ignores the global processes of
integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes
mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness
rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington, then we
have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to find
ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in
a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of
governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market
societies to seek confirmation of their cultural identity. On the other
hand, what will happen with the transnational corporations, global
electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the
civilisations predicted by Huntington mean the collapse, no more and no
less, of the world economy, the establishment of new walls in place of
international highways, barriers to communications, the flow of transport,
goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century
but it is absurd for the future.
I believe that the conflicts in Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and
Tadzhikistan are temporary and will fade with the integration of these
countries into the world economy. In a similar way, the pretensions and
extremism of the catholics and the French-speaking minority in Quebec will
also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes
but in the reduction of the role of the nation state and in their struggle
for identity. When I say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not
mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I
also reject the "Western integrationalist", R.Bartley. The world will
neither disintegrate into separate civilisations, since this would be to
deny 6000 years of integration, nor will it be dominated by mass American
culture which would be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of cultural
autonomy. If immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall American
cultural influence did indeed grow in leaps and bounds, then, I believe,
this process will soon be compensated by the cultural progress of Japan,
Europe, Russia and other countries. American culture itself has been
subjected to the serious influence of Latin American, African, Asian and
European cultural products and has become pluralistic rather than purely
American. The cultural identity of each people and ethnic group can be
defended in two ways in the modern world: the first of these is via
isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation
and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries
which have isolated themselves from the world is lamentable. In modern
conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains
is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress.
I believe that the future will be defined by three parallel processes
directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy.
The first of these is the globalisation of world culture the
constituent elements of which will be defined not by a single or group of
larger nations but by a more universal process.
The second is self-identification and the rebirth of a large number,
about 50--60, of local cultures which will become part of the process of
global change. They will find their niches and will complement global
cultural intergration.
The third process is perhaps most important -- that of the hitherto
unseen intensive processes of cultural mixing between revitalised national
cultures and global culture as a whole.
Some of these concepts will be examined in greater detail at a later
stage and I will provide further evidence. What, however, remains of the
newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will be subjected
to the same structural changes (integrational and autonomising) to which
them entire modern civilisation has been subjected. Some of these will
flourish in global relations, others will complement the existing global
culture.
Is it really possible to compare two Islamic countries such as Morocco
or Iran and would they possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural
conflict? Hardly. I am also convinced that the Eastern Orthodox countries
will become integrated into Europe rather than form their own independent
cultural and political community. All the civilisations described by
Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in
common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but
is no weaker either. It is stronger, however, than isolationism and
confrontational cultures and religions. Of the cultural characteristics of
Huntington's civilisations the only thing which will remain will be that
which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an
addition and continuation of a new global culture which I predict will be
the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation.
5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
Liberalism is based on private property. Marxism rejects its
significance and absolutises collectivism and integration based on state
coercion.
The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood up to the
test of time and there is now a need for a new ideological and theoretical
synthesis.
M
arxism-Leninism, Maoism, Trotskiyism, albeit in different ways
emphasised the abol