ow otherwise is to explain that communism, the greatest utopia of the
20th century was accepted by practically half of humanity? Or that the
Germans, Italians, Spanish and Japanese believed in fascism? Ideological
religions appeared on the historical scene as a result of the great
cataclysms of the 19th and 20th centuries but above all as a result of the
internationalisation of manufacturing forces and spiritual life. This
internationalisation of manufacturing gave birth to the illusion that the
world might be ordered on the lines of a ready-made political model on the
basis of dogma imposed by a group of people. Utopias become transformed into
mass credo only when the social conflicts and chaos have caused huge
destruction. Historically, mass poverty and mass violence have always caused
mass reactions which has prepared the ground for the appearance of coercive
utopias.
Ideological religions create different types of culture. In their
extreme forms these ideologies have given rise to the cult of personality
and the exaltation of leaders. Just as the ancient peoples prayed to Amon
Ra, Zeuss or Tangra in the 20th century they prayed to Hitler, Stalin, Mao
and Pol Pot. Of course, the cult of personality is not the only type of mass
utopia. The ideological religions also created the cult of the system
itself, the notion of the future, power and its structures. All this was the
imposition of freedom of thought. In certain countries and certain peoples
this type of mass awareness lead to accompanying forms of daily life, dress
and behaviour humiliating man in favour to ideology.
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern
European totalitarian regimes was the destruction of the totalitarian type
of mass awareness. The collapse of the Berlin wall not only destroyed the
communist utopia but also created the opportunities for the entire
historical removal of ideological religions. Hitler, Stalin and Mao had
aspirations of disseminating their utopian notions over the entire world.
Fortunately this did not happen. The destruction of ideological religions
did not mean the ideological and spiritual division of the world not the
final removal of the danger of new coercive utopias. The removal of the iron
curtain does still not mean the final end to global inequality, economic
violence or the impossibility of the appearance of new ideological
religions. IN order to put a stop to such a danger many things will have to
change in this world.
Global awareness is radically different from the ideological religions
and the culture of the coercive utopia. It is developing as a result of the
new communications and the natural technological progress of humanity. It is
not a consequence of violence and coercion but of the modern technological
and cultural revolution. Its origin has to be looked for in the intermixing
of values and the criteria for the most advanced cultures of the world and
in their constant enrichment. The intermixing of different cultural values
leads to the formation of common thought processes with common foundations
which have began to develop rapidly since the falling of the iron curtain.
Global awareness is the common understanding of people for the common
problems of the world which cannot be resolved by one or a single group of
countries or by one or a group of peoples. This is the realisation of the
interdependence of the world and that the tragedy of one individual people
might lead to a tragedy for all. Global awareness is also a change in the
hierarchy of human values and in the extent to which common human conflicts
come to the fore. The enormous problems of pollution, the appearance of
holes in the ozone layer, global warming, the destruction of the rain
forests, AIDS, cancer and other mass illnesses of the 20th century, the
dangers posed by nuclear energy and numerous other problems are occupying
the thoughts of people around the world more and more and motivating their
actions.
Global awareness is reflected in the growing realisation of a larger
part of humanity that only human rights, individual freedom, freedom of
speech and the press and the gradual improvement in labour and living
conditions around the world can guarantee the preservation of the human
species. The most important thing is that in this way, gradually but
undeviatingly the common criteria for good and evil, justice and injustice,
progress and stagnation are being formed. This is the basic meaning of the
new theoretical and ideological synthesis which has been mentioned in an
earlier chapter.
Global awareness is developing on the basis of the cultural images and
standards of world significance and which do not belong to any one national
cultural school. Education and science, information and the media, trade and
finances, sport and tourism, food and daily life are a part of this growing
awareness. Today over 90% of the adult population of the world receive
information from more and more accessible and homogenous sources of culture.
The universal heroes, the universal film stars, the universal sports idols
are all symbols of one and the same phenomenon. Claudia Schiffer, Naomi
Cambell and Cindy Crawford are the greatest models at the end of the 20th
century because they are a reflection of the diversity of the ideal of
beauty and universal aesthetic standards. The travelling peoples have taken
their cuisine all over the world to Latin America, the USA, Russia and
Africa. Pele was the world football idol and the death of the racing driver
Aerton Senna was mourned all over the world. The reason is because we are
becoming citizens of one global village about which each subsequent
generation will know more than we do.
Today, global awareness is still just a trend but a trend which is
developing in the space of hours and minutes. The world corporations, the
global culture, mixed marriages, the "travelling peoples", universal
communications and values and common experiences are all an undisputed fact.
However, the trend towards the formation of a universal global awareness is
still at its very beginning. It has to cope with national and local
prejudices, ethnic enmity as well as social and economic inequality. This
trend towards the formation of the global awareness of humanity cannot be
stopped. It will take a long time and will most probably reach its peak in
the next century.
5. MULTICULTURE AND GLOBAL CULTURE
Multiculture or the combination of global, mixed and local cultures is
the main feature of the Fourth Civilisation.
T
he modern era was a time of cultural coercion. The violation,
plundering and export of huge amounts of works of art to Europe and America
was a symbol of colonialism. Fascism and Communism with their ideologies of
unification destroyed many cultural traditions and opened the way to the
violent imposition of monolithic cultural products. Imperialism in all its
manifestations bore within itself the idea of unification and multiculture
or, in other words, the domination of one culture and the transformation of
others into museum exhibits. One only has to compare the ancient cultures of
Benin and Nigeria and their artifacts exhibited in the British museum or the
culture of Bukhara and Samarkand preserved in the vaults of the Hermitage in
St.Petersburg with what has remained in the local museums.
The 20th century was a century of colonialism and imperialism, a
century of the greatest progress of humanity. It was at the same time a
century of the greatest destruction and oppression. One can but hope that
the New Civilisation will resolve the problems of cultural aggression.
However, this will be conditional upon the removal of media imperialism as a
threat to cultural imperialism. Only the future will tell whether the trends
of imperialism and cultural monopolism associated with the outgoing
civilisation or the global trends of the Fourth Civilisation will prevail. I
personally believe that historical progress and the global changes in the
world are taking us towards something different from cultural imperialism
and the dominance of one culture over others. There is, however, absolutely
no guarantee that we will turn the clock back.
If the trend towards imperialism persists and is not modernised, if the
media and cultural unification of the world takes place as a result of the
cultural domination of a number of countries via the trans-national
corporations then the forecasts of Samuel Huntington may very well come
true. The 21st century will be a century of conflicts between cultures and
civilisations and the slow and turbulent development of economic
polycentrism and associated cultural structures.
The cultural equivalent of economic polycentrism is multiculture.
Multiculture is the combination of many different cultures and their
intermixing and also the preservation and the development of international
and supra-national relations. The preservation of the cultures of small and
large nations will be preserved with the relevant legislation and economic
conditions. Multiculture means the rejection of media and cultural
imperialism. Together with economic and political polycentrism this is the
next most important feature of the Fourth Civilisation. Integration causes
either oppression or intermixing which is at the foundation of multiculture.
It is this intermixing stimulated by economic growth will be the main
cultural feature of the 21st century.
The most obvious manifestation of this process is in the area of
showbusiness, art and music, dance and the fine arts. The resolution of
religious conflicts, however, will be more difficult. The formation of a
global culture and the localisation of cultural ethnic communities will have
determinate roles in both economic and political processes. Globalisation
and autonomisation are already leading to the huge re-structuring of
cultural communities. Everything I have mentioned in this chapter: the
intermixing of cultures and global culture, the intermixing of ethnic groups
and the "travelling peoples", the formation of global awareness are features
of this process.
There are, of course, no absolute or automatic processes. I am speaking
only of a determining trend for the future. There will be processes and
events which will lead us forward but there will also be retrograde
influences. There will be a struggle for the establishment of new relations
between civilisations and the temporary victories of the protectors of the
past. The greatest task faced by the modern world is the removal of cultural
imperialism, the intermixing of religions and cultures with mutual
tolerance. The international media have great responsibility to avoid
becoming the advocates of new forms of oppression. However, they could also
become the proponents of a new spirit of multiculture. In practice this
means the protection and support of small and large cultures, a respect for
the daily life and traditions of smaller nations, the implementation of
policies of mutual adaptation of different cultures and, importantly, the
rejection of totalitarian cultural forms.
The last of these steps is of particular importance. As can be seen in
table 14, there are in the world today five basic religions. Each of these
religions and the cultures which are associated have their own geographical
and historical roots and form part of the world's cultural and ideological
treasury. However, at the same time each of these religions has its sects
and branches which would like to transform their religion into one of world
dominance and demonstrate intolerance and irreconcilability to
non-believers. This is as true for Christians as it is of the Muslims. The
gentle nature and lack of aggression inherent in Orthodox Christianity,
perhaps, make it the only exception. After the collapse of the two-bloc
system of the world the ideological vacuums were filled by religions and a
semi-overt struggle for domination began. A number of evangelical Christian
sects decided that the time was ripe for them to impose their own belief on
the world with little concern for the fact that they were depriving many
people of their individual freedom and turing them into obedient
instruments.
Table 14
Region
Christianity %
Islam %
Hinduizum %
Buddhism %
Judaism %
Africa
East Asia
South Azia [62]
Europe
Latin America
North America
Oceania
Fm. USSR[63]
236300
22300
125900
420300
392200
227200
21500
102200
15,3
1,4
8,1
27,2
25,3
14,7
1,4
6,6
215800
22300
534900
9200
600
2600
100
31500
26,4
2,7
65,5
1,1
0,1
0,3
*
3,9
130
*
644000
600
600
700
300
*
0,2
*
99,5
0,1
0,1
0,1
*
*
*
143400
150900
200
500
200
*
400
*
48,5
51,0
0,1
0,2
0,1
*
0,1
300
*
3900
1500
1000
7900
100
3100
1,7
*
21,9
8,4
5,6
44,4
0,6
17,4
Total
1548500
100
817000
100
647500
100
295600
100
71800
100
*100000, 0,1% Source: The World Christian Encyclopedia, 1985.
Islamic fundamentalism has also displayed public intolerance to
non-believers and the representatives of other countries. The murders in
Egypt and the execution of foreign hostages in Algeria and international
Islamic terrorism are examples of intolerance towards the traditions of
others. It is extremely important that such features of modern religions be
overcome. This will not be resolved by force but with the efforts of the
world community and states and their politicians and government to achieve
reconciliation. If modern Islam turns towards modernism combining its
profound cultural heritage with the achievements of the modern world it will
become part of the New tolerant Civilisation. The other alterative is
isolationism and the division of global cultures and traditions. During the
middle ages in Asia Minor and other places in the world Islam was the
embodiment of progress and was a source of innovation and new philosophical
and cultural trends, in the modern world it could assume a similar role.
The opening-up of cultures and religions to each other is a slow and
clearly painful process. It requires people to live democratically and in
mutual tolerance particularly of those nations which live in the border
areas between two geographically and religiously different zones. One
shining example is that of the Israelis and the Palestinians who since the
historical events of 1993 have been attempting to find a new
non-confrontational model for the resolution of their conflict. The
Bulgarians, Greeks and the Turks also have a vital role to play living as
they do on two sides of the divide between Christianity and Islam. There is
much dependent on the way in which these countries will resolve the problems
of their ethnic minorities and international relations. Cultures and
religions have to be sensitive to other cultures and religions. This does
not only mean avoiding conflict but actively assisting and complementing
each other. Only in this way will the principle of multiculture be able to
throw off the burden of the outgoing world of imperialism.
Perhaps, the ideal model of multiculture and tolerance for others can
be seen on the Hawaiian islands. Japanese and Polynesians, Americans and
Koreans, Buddhists and evangelists live in harmony and peace on such a small
piece of land. After so many centuries of inter-cultural conflicts the
nations which make up the multicultural communities of the USA have achieved
an impressive state of tolerance and unity.
I am convinced that the idea of global multiculture is not at odds with
the universal processes of globalisation. Clearly the structures of world
culture and the structure of the New Civilisation and will contain the
following mutually influential components:
-- the emerging global culture is being developed and disseminated via
the world media and is becoming distinct from the culture of the large
nations which have done much to create it;
-- the culture of the large nations which together with the
establishment of the principles of political polycentrism and multiculture
will gradually lose their ability to influence and erase the culture of
smaller nations;
-- the culture of the smaller independent nations which require more
specific forms of protection and whose preservation and development is one
of the most important issues in the modern world;
-- intermixed or border cultures as a product of the mutual influence
of individual nations.
There is little doubt that during the 19th century and for the entire
period of the 20th, there was a great deal of inequity between cultures and
religions. This was a result of colonial oppression, of two world and
hundreds of local conflicts and the violent attempts to impose cultural
domination. After the collapse of the two world systems humanity has every
opportunity to stop this trend and open up the way for multiculture as the
direct alternative to cultural imperialism. A balancing element to this is
the undoubted development of global cultural values which will take their
inspiration from the larger countries and nations who control the world
communications. The responsibility of the owners of global communications
and the governments of the countries in which they function will be to
ensure the development of the smaller countries and their integration into
global culture exchange.
There is no doubt that sooner or later this process will require strict
forms of global regulation, less passive and powerless than perhaps that of
UNESCO but, nevertheless, similar in terms of its profound and multi-lateral
experience. Many small nations and languages have already disappeared and
this process will, no doubt, continue for a number of years to come.
Countries living in isolation can not but be affected by this process.
Cultural autonomy is closely associated with weak economies. Weak economies
permit a low level of economic integration and lead to conflicts rather than
cooperation between ethnic groups and culture. This is an almost universal
truth and can be seen in Iran and Iraq, Israel and Turkey, India, the
Balkans and the Caususus.
The opposite example of cultural intermixing and emergent multiculture
can be seen in those regions of the world where people have realised the
senselessness of cultural assimilation and the value of peaceful cultural
co-existence. The USA, Australia, Europe, Cuba, Brazil and a number of other
countries in the world are fine examples of the intermixing and cooperation
of different races and cultures.
Chapter Ten
THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER
1. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPERPOWERS
The Fourth Civilisation will change the global political order. This is
a logical consequence of the end of the cold war the appearance of new world
economic powers and the globalisation of finances and the stock markets.
T
he political history of humanity has developed through a number of
large cycles. The First Civilisation was a time of great empires. Later,
over a period of about 10 centuries, from the 4th to the 13th century, the
world was witness to the collapse of empire and the formation of small
unstable states and the large scale migration of tribes and entire nations.
The Third Civilisation saw the development of nation states and new imperial
aspirations which reached their height with the creation and the struggle
between the two world systems. The New Civilisation will to a certain extent
once more return us to the features of the Second Civilisation but to a
qualitatively new cultural and economic level of development as well
migration of large groups of people the collapse of great blocs and empires,
the redrawing of national borders. Is this part of a logical cycle or is it
merely a temporary political cataclysm?
I believe that the cycle of predominant political concentration has
already come to an end and we are entering a new cycle of the domination of
global culture and the parallel development of local features. This, of
course, does not mean that globalisation will come to a halt but that the
parallel processes of globalisation and localisation will exert a strong
influence on current state and political formations. The 19th century left
us a legacy of the concept of the Great Powers. The 20th century brought in
the concept of the two superpowers: the USA and the USSR.
With the collapse of the USSR the world found itself faced with two
possible alternatives: either to develop monocentrically with the domination
of the single remaining superpower, the USA, or to search for a new
geo-political form. A number of researchers, politicians and journalists
seemed to be in favour of the idea of the exclusive role of the USA as the
superpower to lead the world into the 21st century. Indeed, during the first
years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union this seemed
possible. Without its basic enemy, the USA was transformed into the most
powerful economic and political force in the world. After 1989--1990 the USA
seemed to be the only power capable of resolving a number of world conflicts
and stabilising the world order. The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the
intervention in Somalia, the positive role of the USA in the peace process
in Bosnia in 1995 and the resolution of the problem of Palestinian autonomy
served to strengthen this conviction.
The USA are still the strongest nation state in the world but,
nevertheless, I believe that the time of the superpowers has passed. The
Fourth Civilisation will finally reject them and even now, during the
transition between eras, there are already noticeable trends and processes
which support this.
The gradual twilight of the superpowers is for a number of reasons a
general process. It is consequence of the trend towards global balance and
the expected balancing of the global market. It is also due to a number of
reasons associated with the cyclic development of geopolitical structures. I
mentioned earlier that the economic development of the world has become
polycentric. Japan, South Korea, more recently China and a number of other
Asian economic powers have achieved significant economic strength. European
integration has undoubtedly raised the importance of the European Economic
Community in the world division of labour. The Latin American markets have
become more attractive for investments. The globalisation of the economy has
allowed for many more countries to accumulate economic strength and
self-confidence. During the cold war and up to 1989 the appearance of new
powerful and independent economic centres was of secondary importance.
Military power and nuclear weapons were an undisputed factor in the
determination of political power. This trend persisted for the entire period
of the 20th century. In the 1960's and the 1970's there was a growing
conviction that there would in fact be no victor after a nuclear conflict.
Indeed, after the collapse of the Berlin wall there are still people who
continue to wag their sabres and claim that they can achieve their aims
through armed conflict. Nevertheless, things do seem to have changed. The
emergence of new technology and new economic opportunities have come to the
fore.
This has reduced, at least for the time being, the role of Russia in
world politics leaving it to ponder the questions of its domestic political
and economic restructuring. For the same reasons, the USA now finds itself
in a completely new situation.
The vacuum which was formed after the collapse of COMECON and the
Warsaw Pact (1990--1991) has begun to be filled not only by the USA but
Germany, France, Japan and the European community as a whole. Although this
process is rather veiled and timid it will continue in the future. Germany
demonstrated its new-found self-confidence with its independent position on
Bosnia. The nuclear tests carried out by France in the Pacific in 1995 were
more significant from a political point of view than scientific. Similar
ideas can be read into the applications by Japan and Germany to join the
Security Council.
The other issue which has always seemed to dog the USA and which will
undermine its potential as the only superpower in the world is the issue of
economic expenditure. Since the Second World War the USA has run up a huge
armaments bill which has lead to a colossal increase in its foreign debt.
Today the world's financial systems is under an enormous strain because of
the constant increase in American borrowings, especially in the 1980's
(table 15). In the 1970's and 1980's, however, this seemed not to be such a
serious matter. The USA at the time was the leading figure in the Brenton
Woods system and the dollar was the only reserve currency in the world and
the US was able with some ease to compensate for the debts it had
accumulated. In the 1980's the USA was paying 250--300 billion dollars in
interest alone on its foreign debt. The majority of global economists
believe that if this trend persists for much longer the American economy
will begin to slide and the dollar will lose its position to the yen and the
German mark.
Table 15
Federal debt of the USA
Year
1900
1920
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
1992
1994
Billion Dollars
Per head of population (USD)
Interest paid on debt (bill)
% of federal income
1,2
16,6
-
-
21,2
228
-
-
256,1
1688
5,7
13,4
284,1
1572
9,2
10,0
370,1
1814
19,3
9,9
907,7
3985
74,9
12,7
3233
13000
264,8
21,1
4064
846
292,3
21,1
4692
026
296,3
80,3
Source: Bureau of Public Debt, US Dept of Treasury.
There is little doubt that the USA and Russia will progressively have
to reduce their military expenses which are the main causes for budget
deficits and huge debt. IN 1994 the USA spent 280.6 billion dollars on
defence which more than all the other countries of the world put together
with the exception of Russia. US military expenditure was 9 times greater
than that of Germany (35 billion dollars); 9 times that of France (34
billion); 7 times that of the UK (41 billion); 50 times that of Japan (5.9
billion dollars); 100 times that of China (2.7 billion)[64]. I
have never seen accurate or proven figures for Russia but I believe that up
to 1990 they were similar to the US. There is no economy in the world which
can compensate for such expenditure and bear the burden of competition in
the global market. For this reason the role of the USA and Russia as the two
superpowers has begun to subside. Superpower tension might reappear in the
world only if the two-bloc system is revived. There is, however, little
likelihood of this since global financial markets are so interlinked and
interdependent and for all the other reasons associated with the emergent
New Civilisation.
This leads on to the other question of where the new centre of economic
and political power will develop and who will take on the roles and
responsibilities of the USA and Russia. Russia clearly needs time to
reorganise its economy and bring it in line with the needs of the market.
However, even if this were to take place within the shortest possible period
of time -- 10--15 years, it would not be able to assume the role of a
superpower, nor would it want to. On the other hand Jacques Atalie and other
writers have forecast that "economic power is moving away from America
towards Europe and the Pacific".[65] I believe that it would more
accurate to make another conclusion. It is true that during the Third
Civilisation the Euroatlantic powers made great progress in their domination
of the world at the beginning of the processes of globalisation. It is also
true that after the 1960's the Asian economic powers began gradually to free
themselves from the protectionism of the USA and Europe and they will play a
very active global role in the coming 21st century.
This fact, however, is insufficient to support the claim that "economic
power is moving away from America towards Europe and the Pacific". It is
more likely that there will be a period of levelling and mutual balance
between the Japanese, American and European economies. This is possibly the
most effective solution. Of course, this is also associated with the
reduction in the responsibilities and burdens of the USA and the involvement
of other countries such as Japan. The superpowers will disappear but it will
not necessarily follow that the USA will preserve their role as one of the
world's main political and economic centres. The world can no longer benefit
from American domination or its downfall. In the same way the world could
have done without the political and military conflicts within the former
USSR.
2. FROM IMPERIALISM TO POLYCENTRISM
"The old geopolitical order has left the stage and a new world order
has been born".
Jacques Atalie
T
he central issue is what will replace the two-bloc world order based on
the dominance of the superpowers. Other similar periods of transition in
history have lead to geopolitical chaos, conflicts, wars and huge loss of
human life. The first years after the overthrow of the totalitarian regime
in Eastern Europe seemed to bear out this sad truth. Today the dangers have
not yet passed and seem to confound those who are optimistic of a new world
order.
There is no single or single group of powers capable of establishing
this order. It will have to be created through a amalgamation of local and
regional resolutions and the renunciation of ideas associated with the
domination of one country or nation. This is the main feature of the New
Civilisation. During the entire period of the outgoing civilisation monarchs
were engaged in struggles for power, conquering and losing territory and
making plans on how to expand their dominions. In the 19th and 20th
centuries the idea of world domination arose and the revival of the huge
empires of Caesar of Fredrich Barbarossa. The greatest empires of the Third
Civilisation were the two political and military blocs which dominated the
world for 50 years.
I believe that the era of imperialism will be replaced by a new world
order based on the principle of polycentrism, the alternative to imperialism
and monocentrism. This principle is a rejection of the monopolism and
imperial aspirations of any single nation or ideology. Polycentrism is that
level of international relations which is the most concomitant for the
opening up of the world and its globalisation.
Polycentrism will not appear overnight. However, I am more than
convinced that it is inevitable and part of the logic of historical
development. The alternative is new confrontation, new violence with the
accompanying threats of thermo-nuclear conflict. There are two basic
conditions without which polycentrism and the natural competition between
nations and countries cannot develop:
Firstly, the inevitable, albeit gradual, disappearance of the super
power phenomenon.
Secondly, the evolutionary nature of the development of polycentrism as
a system of international relations. The natural replacement of the bi-polar
model with polycentric structures will pass through a number of phases, each
of which will take differing lengths of time.
We are already experiencing the first of these phases. The world is
undergoing transition from the bi-polar model of confrontation to a
multi-polar world. It is quite realistic to assume that in the next ten or
so years we will pass into a transitory phase of a tri-polar world. This
tri-polar world began to emerge based on the existing framework of the
bi-polar world as early as the 1970's and 1980's. This model is based on the
USA and a number of states which gravitate around it, Europe and the Far
East lead by Japan. These three economically integrated poles have been
developing gradually over the past 25--30 years. They are economically very
compact and consist mainly of the economic interdependence of the individual
countries. At the same time these three economic centres are strongly
dependent on and open to each other creating one of the greatest
opportunities for the peaceful development of the world. The tri-polar world
is the closest alternative to the bi-polar world but is not an easy way out
of the current crisis. The tri-polar model is to a large extent conditional
on the development of common global trends.
At the very beginning of the 21st century both Russia and China will
aspire to become involved in the three large centres of economic power. All
the most sensible politicians in the world believe that without Russia and
China the world cannot develop successfully. This has been a clear feature
of US policy during the Clinton administration. During the next 20--25 years
we shall no doubt witness the development of a five-six-polar world in which
the three main centres will be joined by a number of other new ones. China's
rapid economic development and Russia's enormous resources of raw materials
and its strategical capability will exert significant influence on this
process. The triangular community of the USA, EC and Japan has quite quickly
replaced the bi-polar model the development of a multi-polar model will take
at least 15--20 years. Russia will need time to stabilise its economy and
China will need to consolidate its reform process and balance out its levels
of development.
There is, however, a question of principle here. Will this not take us
back to the beginning of the modern age, to a situation where five or six
great powers dominated the world creating a series of conflicts which may
develop into regional or even world wars? May this not also lead to the
grouping of these powers into two or three political and military groups and
a repeat of the Third Civilisation? It is here that the difference between
the outgoing civilisation and the new era lies. The new powers will not
arise only on one continent, Europe or America. They will develop in all the
continents and within the framework of a single global economy.
I, therefore, believe that the second phase, the transition to a new
world order will be characterised by the gradual transition from five or six
centres to a multi-polar or polycentric world structure. Even at the
beginning of the transition period countries like Brazil, India, Australia,
South Africa and others will increase their geo-political roles. They will
be balanced between the other "great powers" and with their geographical
position and size and increased economic potential they will gradually begin
to assume greater geo-political significance. When speaking of the
polycentric structure of the world, I am not concerned only with the
political aspect but also with the economic and cultural sides of the issue.
At the same time global integration will take place simultaneously in all
countries but will lead to the creation of a number of regional formations.
I also believe that we can expect that the poles of the new world
structure will be defined via the development of a number of economically
integrated blocs which of necessity will be open to one another and will
autonomous units within an expanding integral entity. L.Thorou forecast that
the 21st century would be a century of "quasi-commercial blocs applying
managed trade". This is true to a certain extent but only in the initial
stages since I believe that with the emergence of polycentrism the
autonomous economic regions and commercial blocs will gradually become very
interwoven and to lose their primary borders.
The principle of polycentrism is at the heart of the new world order.
However, these are not the same world centres which existed in the 13th and
the 19th centuries and whose monarchs and presidents went to war every
10--15 years to re-distribute their dominions. They will not be the same
centres which colonised the entire world and imposed their will on other
nations. Polycentrism is the principle of balance between the world's
powers, the umbrella under which new centres will develop and a bridge
leading to a more complete integration of the world. The essence of the
Fourth Civilisation is in the gradual formation of this new world order.
3. THE FATE OF THE NATION STATE
Do not be in a hurry to destroy the nation state. It will not die
suddenly of cardiac arrest but will gradually fade away...
T
he functions and the borders of the nation state depend directly on the
economic maturity of societies. Historically the nation state is a
transitory category. It appeared when nations were being created and the
economic conditions of life were imposing certain certain types of
government and regulation. There were different versions of statism and
state government during the First Civilisation and the Second Civilisation,
more commonly know as the Middle Ages. Nation states, however, are a typical
feature of the Third Civilisation.
The reduction in their role and changes in their functions is a result
of the same phenomena which created them. The globalisation of modern
economies and culture, the media invasions, transnational corporations and
everything else which has been mentioned in other parts of the book are
leading to changes in the borders and the essence of the concept of nation
state as well as in the structure of government and economies. For a number
of decades the inhabitants of the most developed nations have become
growingly aware that the governments for which they may have voted are not
the only centres of power and that the promises of politicians seem to have
little in common with realities and that the implementation of policies
depends on other factors and phenomena.
P.Drucker frequently speaks of a new pluralism. In this he is
absolutely correct. Pluralism does not mean competition between parties and
their leaders. It is a very diverse pluralism of economic, government,
cultural and lobby groups. What is even more significant is that this new
pluralism is becoming more and more international. Corporations and
political parties, foundations and association, information groups and
trans-national media have transformed pluralism in to an universal concept
and the nation state into an annoying but not insurmountable barrier.
It is quite evident that as society develops governmental restrictions
decline along with the significance of national boundaries. For this reason
open societies are a symbol not only of democracy but progress in general. I
believe in the truth of this argument but it is not so simple. Openness
which is inevitable and necessary means nothing in isolation from the
economic processes. Many underdeveloped, ex-colonial countries are both
absolutely open and absolutely poor. Progressive and stable openness comes
about as a result of economic and political progress, the attainment of a
certain level of economic balance. This is not a political whim but a result
from the accumulation and maturity of a given society.
We should not, therefore, be in a hurry to depose the role of the
nation states. They will not disappear overnight but will fade slowly in the
process of the development of relative economic balance. During the Third
Civilisation state power was absolute. During the Third Civilisation state
power was absolute. Ludwig 14th, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin and
Stalin were themselves incorporations of the state. Today, however, this is
impossible. Dictators such as Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Boccassa 1st in the
Central African Republic or Pol Pot in Cambodia have been condemned to
historical oblivion and hatred. However, many other democratically elected
government have felt obliged to "protect" the national output and to isolate
themselves with restrictive import duties and other protectionist barriers.
Those who feel threatened and isolated as a result of their backwardness
rather than integrated have to pay a high cost in terms of armies and
weapons.
Therefore in the under developed countries the nation state will
preserve its traditional functions for a relatively longer period of time.
This will be both natural and progressive if the relevant governments make
efforts to open and adapt their economies to the global market. Adversely,
their countries will continue to vegetate within the conditions of the Third
Civilisation and will begin to lag behind in universal world development.
This issue has another side to its. The movements towards world
openness and integration is a resource of progress. No government will
succeed in the modern world to integrate its people into processes of world
progress if it does not affiliate itself with the World Trade Organisation
and the international financial markets. The decline of the role of the
nation state is a universal process which is taking place more rapidly in
the developed countries and more slowly in those who are still aspiring to
become affiliated with them and slowest of all in those countries who feel
themselves obliged to defend their frail national identity. Nevertheless, no
one country will be able to ignore the common processes of the globalisation
of the world, markets, manufacturing and the media.
What then will become of the nation state and its power?
I believe that the main trends in world development will be as follows:
the role of the nation states will decline in significance whereas the
functions of the local institutions of authority and supra-national and
global coordinators will increase. This is taking place at the moment in
Europe and all other states whose governments are conceding more and more
power to the trans-national corporations, the world media networks or other
autonomous and influential non-governmental organisations. Louis d'Or 14th
in an expression of the absolute nature of power once said, "L'Etat -- c'est
moi". From the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century governments began grudgingly to concede part of their economic power
to the owners of large private enterprises. Now as a result of the
globalisation the national governments have no choice other than to give up
many of their prerogatives. This is a natural process which follows the
logic of world development. Many people find it difficult to understand and
regard national honour and pride as a priority and any suggestion to the
contrary provokes nationalistic reaction. There have always been such
governments and there, no doubt, will be for many decades to come. However,
such policies which seem to forget the need for global and humane
responsibility will lead nations into the back roads of development. Sooner
rather than later nations will realise that they have been deceived and will
seek recompense for the politicians who brought them to that state.
The borders of states in the transition to the Fourth Civilisation will
continue to narrow as a result of major technological and social changes. If
you remember the message of A.Toffler in chapter four of this book, he
predicted that the new technologies would transfer power both downwards to
the local institutions of authority and upwards to the global regulators and
the transnational corporations. On one hand many economic and social
functions will become much more effective if they are transferred from
governments to civil societies and are controlled by legislation. This is
the case with the planning and coordination of a series of macro and
micro-economic processes. This is also the case with social welfare and in
particular pension funds, health case and academic and scientific research.
ON the other hand national governments are not in a position to regulate
independently the global environment, world financial markets, the global
redistribution of resources, goods and services, information flow and the
media etc.. The more people, goods and services cross over national borders
the less significance these borders will have. This will in turn lead to
changes in the prerogatives of nation states.
At the end of the 20th century the state is too small an institution to
resolve global problems and too large to resolve its own local issues. This
is also a result of the new technology, the restructuring of manufacturing
and the market.
A typical example of such a bi-lateral change is offered by the member
countries of the European Union. According to some researchers since 1957
about half of the authority of the nation state has been transferred either
to local authority or to the European Commission in Brussels. This is
perhaps an isolated example of a regional alliance. However, the same
process seems to be taking place in the USA where the American political
system has been stretched vertically upwards by the transnational
corporations and financial markets and downwards by the individual states
and the non-governmental and private organisations. Bill Clinton would
hardly have the authority to implement such a wide ranging programme of
reform as the "New Deal" of President Roosevelt in the 1930's. Even in the
case of the states such as the USA national governments do not have the same
authority that they had 40 or 50 years ago. They have also taken upon
themselves a range of global responsibilities with which to compensate for
the decline authority and the transfer of the real power to the
trans-national corporations. The specific global role of the USA at the
beginning of the 1990's will soon have to be shared with others. It is not
fair on the American people to carry the huge burden of military
expenditure, the peace-keeping operations of the UN and so on. It will not
be long before they will also involve Russia, Japan and Europe (France and
Germany). IN this way the gradual decline in the significance of the nation
state is as true for the USA as it is for everywhere else.
A distinguishing feature of the modern nation state is its integration
and strong links with the civil society. A number of writers such as P.
Drucker and J. Lukac have written that the sovereign state will become just
one of a number of centres for identification and integration rather than
the only one and will coexist and compete with the trans-regional,
supra-national and local, even tribal structures. When this rule of logical
development is applied universally then nations attain a higher level of
enrichment. Switzerland, for example, leads all statistical classifications
on the basis of GDP per head of population and this is not only due to the
success of the Swiss banks. This is rather a result of the co-existence of
the trans-national corporations and the banks, strong local authorities and
the state (government and parliament) which fulfils the role of a bridge
between the two sectors. The lack of bureaucracy, the active role of the
local population in global business and the decision making processes is a
particulary strong feature of the Swiss political system.
The modern state will have less and less international authority.
Globalisation opens borders and the world market "erodes" sovereignty. By
transferring their authority to the new global leaders and to local leaders
the national governments will have less and less capabilities. This,
however, raises the issue of the preservation of the identity of nations and
states in the face of the emergent global culture and global awareness. It
is the "travelling peoples" which will succeed with their sustainable and
strong cultural links which not only produce avant garde technology but use
it to effect. It is not states and weapons but technological power plus
knowledge which will play a decisive role in this question.
4. AFTER THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY
The modern-day left is like the right undressed and the modern-day
right is like a well dressed left.
(political jokes from the end of the 20th century)
A
lthough I frequently speak of the Fourth Civilisation, the new
ideological and theoretical synthesis and balanced development I realize how
difficult it is for these new concepts to be accepted by the modern world.
This is particularly true for the smaller (albeit proud) countries such as
Bulgaria. In face of the new global changes and challenges there is no
difference between the small and the large countries. We are all part of the
same game. Some are quicker while some are slower but we are all undergoing
the same profound changes. In Eastern Europe three years were sufficient to
understand the crisis of universal political identity which the West has
long been aware of.
For more than 100 years the political left in the world has been
associated with the new role of the working class, social guarantees,
nationalisation of the basic means of production and the expropriation from
the expropriators etc.. The right has always been linked with the defence of
large and medium scale private capital, traditions and security, no state
intervention in business and non-involvement in social matters. However, in
the modern world at the end of the 20th century, with the exception of a few
fringe parties and movements, there is no country or political party in the
world which resembles these traditional concepts of the left and right.
Together with the collapse of the Third Civilisation we are also
experiencing a crisis of political identity. This is a consequence of the
new ideological and theoretical synthesis, the changes in ownership and the
social and class structure as well as the end of the traditional state
mechanisms. The object of the differences between the left and the right is
disappearing. The entire world is undergoing a process of ownership
socialisation and states are being integrated into civil societies in which
neither the old left nor the old right can preserve their traditional
status.
During the present time of chaos and the growing mistrust towards the
traditional leaders, of left-wing promises made by right-wing politicians
and the concern of the business sector for social issues we should expect
too much. The political inertia is very strong and only a minority would
take the electoral risk of trying to overthrow the traditional symbols. What
we are witness to at the moment is the adaptation of the old phraseology to
new world realities. Whether they want it or not the left and the right wing
parties in the world are intuitively moving towards a state of "balanced
development" and will fight for domination of its ideological territory. The
"left" no longer reject the concept of private capital and do not demand
nationalisation. The "right" are no longer ashamed to speak of social
programmes and the needs of the poor. The borders between the traditional
electorates are fading as a result of a process of irreversible changes in
the social and class structure of society.
As a consequence many new parties have appeared which give voice to
localised interests within a given country or region. The "success" of Ross
Perot at the presidential elections in 1992 and national independence
parties in Canada or Catalonia and Northern Italy are features of the same
phenomenon: the change in the foundations and structures and economic and
social interests is leading to changes in political doctrines and political
parties. The traditional parties which succeed in making the transition and
re-orientate themselves rapidly within the complex situation of the modern
world will survive and their traditional names will be no more than a mere
decoration. Those who delay will fade away and gradually open the way to the
new political formations.
The end of the crisis of modern political identity will come quite
quickly. Many of the parties of the Socialist and Liberal Internationals or
Christian Democratic parties are making timid steps towards changes in their
programmes. Some of them are rejecting their traditional programmes outright
with the justification of the need for a new pragmatism. The former
communist parties of Eastern Europe changed their names to "socialist" or
"social-democratic". Some of them have become so closely associated with
large-scale capital that they already resemble the bourgeois parties of end
of the 19th century.
Together with the changes in ownership and the social and class
structure, as well as the new borders of the nation state and the transition
to global polycentrism, the changes in modern political parties and
doctrines is another important feature of the changes in world civilisation.
The rapprochement between party programmes and views which is taking place
at the moment is a consequence of the new ideological synthesis. It will not
be long before political pluralism will take its stand on the new problems
of the Fourth Civilisation and the transition to it.
There are two further processes linked with the problem of political
identity which I would like to mention. The first of these is linked with
the obvious need for regional and trans-national political formations such
as the Party of European Socialists, for example. The second is the need for
new types of voting systems and the development of direct democracy. My
friend the American political scientist Theodore Becker refers to this as
"teledemocracy". The world telecommunication systems such as the Internet
provide wonderful opportunities for the direct involvement of millions and
billions of people in the decision-taking processes. Today, there are very
few politicians who are aware of this, a few others are sceptical and
concerned about preserving their own power and forces of manipulation.
For me there is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will lead to
enormous changes in political life and its structures, types of government,
electoral mechanisms and decision taking. These are not utopias, nor are
they long-term forecasts. These are simply the results of something which is
appearing before out very eyes.
5. THE GLOBAL COORDINATORS
The Fourth Civilisation will be at one and the same time an open,
polycentric and integrated world. This will require a more effective system
of global coordination.
W
hen analysing the system of the Fourth Civilisation, I naturally came
upon the problem of global coordination. This once again brought to my mind
the unsystematic but indicative thoughts of Lenin on the "single factory for
all workers and peasants", Stalin's idea of the "world wide victory of
communism", Hitler's thoughts on the "World Reich" and Fukoyama's writings
on the "End of History" etc.. A great number of researchers from the World
Federation for Future Studies have also written on the need for a world
government.
There is clearly some logic to this argument. Globalisation will
require much more than ever before increased global control. As the
processes develop and political polycentrism increases there will be a
growing need for world coordination. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it
will be possible in the near future to establish such a global government.
This is an element of the distant future to which neither I nor my
generation belong. Of course, the Fourth Civilisation will cover the entire
period of the 21st century and no doubt future generations of our
grandchildren and great-grand children will have to face the issue.
Today the world is faced with hundreds of global problems which lead to
collapse of the bi-polar world structures. There are a number of world
organisations involved in these problems such as the UN, the World Trade
Organisation and the IMF based on the need for compromises between nation
states and their products. Since compromise between nation states is at the
basis of the development of the world organisations their capabilities to
act in the real conditions of the modern world are seriously restricted. If
we want the world organisations to succeed, they will have to receive wide
empowerment and responsibilities for the global problems which are outside
the domain of nation states. This is the only way in which a united world of
small and large states and cultures will be able to face up to the
challenges of supra-national environmental interests. It is, of course,
absurd to speak of a world government, but it is clear that there is an
obvious need for a coordinating body which from the very outset will be able
to resolve military and ecological crises, regulate the conditions for world
finance and the fight against international crime etc..
It is, therefore, evident that the modern world needs a revision of the
Constitution of the United Nations and the expansion of the powers of the
Security Council as well as the establishment of new institutions. Many of
these have already been proposed by a number of leading world politicians
and intellectuals. These include the Council for Ecological Security of the
United Nations. A reflection of the new directions in thought are the new
structures within the United Nations and its specialised organisations
including UNESCO, INIDO, FAO and others.
This process of expansion has to be carried out very carefully with the
gradual empowerment of specialised national organisations with the rights
and responsibilities currently born by nation states. I expect that the main
priority will be global economic control and the resolution of global
environmental and social issues. The restructuring of the UN, the creation
of an effective World Bank, the increase in the prerogatives of the World
Trade Organisation and the empowerment of all these organisations to deal
with the real problems of the world is the path to balanced development.
This path will be difficult, slow and gradual but there is no other way. The
alternative is for the new communications, computers and automated factories
to dig a deeper gorge between the poor and the rich rather than a source for
democracy and freedom.
At the same time the large nations have to double and treble their
efforts to create a new climate in the world and another type of global
intercourse. This may lead to the institutionalisation of the meetings of
the G-7 and its expansion to include Russia and China and perhaps a few
other nations. It may be a good idea to hold regular meetings of the heads
of state of the whole world. There are a number of possibilities. The most
important thing is for us to realise that the new age which we are entering
requires new type of thinking and a new understanding of our own
responsibilities.
THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED, THE NATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
(instead of a conclusion)
T
his book is an expression of my inner spiritual world and my thoughts
over a number of years on the present state and the potential future of our
confused world. I have been profoundly influenced by the major political
changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Eastern European
political systems and their economic structures. I am acutely aware that the
"Fourth Civilisation" will provoke a number of different reactions. During
such a watershed period in our history unanimity is dangerous and
unnecessary. Indeed, the book which I have written contains a number of
generalisations on the character of global change at the border between two
millennia, the periodisation of history and the crisis of the entire modern
civilisation. The logic of my research has lead me to a number of
conclusions on the new geo-political nature of the world and the necessity
of global economic and political regulation.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not based on abstract proposals or
invented eloquent phrases. All my conclusions are based on experience and
suffering, on years of research and reading as well as specific practical,
academic experiments and political experience. The "Fourth Civilisation" is
not a forecast, nor futuristic literature but an evaluation of the facts as
they are. It is an attempt to overcome the academic dogma of the 19th
century which have existed for over 150 years. I am interested in the clash
of ideas and I realise that many of my conclusions merit further analysis,
something which I intend to do in the future. I can now see with delight
many new areas for creative work.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not intended to reveal all the details of
the issues which it raises but to unify them within one general concept and
to reveal the universal character of the global change which the modern
world in experiencing. The common crisis of the bi-polar world and the
collapse of the Eastern European regimes, the modern conditions of
geo-political chaos in which we are living, the major re-structuring of the
world economy, culture and politics shows that the new realities with which
we are faced have a complex and accumulative effect. Whether we want to or
not, they will lead us to new solutions. My book is concerned with these
solutions and the new methodological approach to the evaluation of world
processes. It is also concerned with the changes in ownership, political and
economic structures and the way in which they are finding more and more
common global ground. I realise that these conclusions may be quite
controversial but I deeply believe in them as indicative proof. Everything
which proves that the old civilisation is fading and that we are entering
into a new Fourth Civilisation is based on the trends and processes to which
we are already witnesses.
I have to confess that everything which I have touched upon in this
book is a starting point for further work based on the country in which I
was born and bred. Bulgaria is now undergoing a difficult and complex crisis
caused by the transition from a totalitarian to a market and pluralist
economy. I have spoken little about Bulgaria in the "Fourth Civilisation"
but in actual fact all my conclusions concern its fate. I believe that I
have been right to keep my conclusions about Bulgaria to a separate book.
This has allowed my to concentrate on the features of global change and to
concentrate on the specific features of Bulgaria at a later stage. For this
reason there is a direct and unifying link between the "Fourth Civilisation"
and my book about Bulgaria which is soon to be published. I hope that they
will both be of interest to all my friends with whom for over ten years now
we have been discussing the fate of the changes and all my colleagues all
over the world with whom I have argued about the future of our world and all
those people with whom I have shared the good and the bad in the political
life of Bulgaria over the past seven years.
Whatever the fate of this book, on completing it I want to thank all
those without whom it would not have been possible. I owe so much to my
mother and my father who bore me and brought me up, my family who have
suffered the deprivations of my almost permanent preoccupation with work, my
teachers from whom I learnt so much, and my colleagues and my friends who
helped me with the book. Nothing in this life can be achieved without love
and I thank all those who believed in me since it was their faith, hoe and
love which inspired so much of my conclusions.
During the entire period of writing and preparing the "Fourth
Civilisation" I asked myself the question, "Which nations will succeed and
will not be lost to the chaos of the global world?". During the great
migrations of the Second Civilisation many nations and ethnic groups lost
their potential and remained on the periphery of the nation states which
were to emerge later. Some of them have disappeared. I hope fervently that
the Bulgarian spirit is not lost and that it does not become dissolved in
the waves of migration of people, information and goods which is on the
horizon. I shall work and I shall struggle for this not to the detriment of
any other nation. I shall work to consolidate the culture and the economy of
Bulgaria in the context of dignified competition.
The nations which will succeed do not live only in the great countries.
These will be the nations which will accept the laws of the new age and will
become the people of the Fourth Civilisation. These nations will not be
divided on the lines of capitalist or socialist, workers or bourgeois,
imperialist or colonial. These peoples will not allow their civic freedoms
to be usurped nor will they recognise cultural or political isolationism and
closed economies. The nations of the Fourth Civilisation will be united with
millions and billions of visible and invisible threads. They will produce
the new values which belong to the whole of humanity.
The road is long and there will be many storms along the way. The New
Civilisation does not require social engineering it requires merely the
pursuance of the logic of progress which our fathers and the outgoing 20th
century have bequeathed to us. It is a difficult but glorious legacy, a
legacy which will require us to be true to our time and those who will come
after us.
Sofia 1996.
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8 P.Kennedy. The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers (see table)
9 Although between Hobson, Hilferding and Lenin there are certain
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to its origin and features are worth of academic recognition. [see.
J.Hobson, Imperialism, L.1902, R.Hilferding, Financial Capital, L.1910.
V.Lenin, Imperialism as the supreme state of capitalism, Essay No.5, Volume
27]
10 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [see table]
11 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Table 28, p.299.
N. Y. 1887.
* Under 50 000. Source: Political Economy, Moscow, 1975. P. 150.
12 Bzezinski. The Great Failure, Sofia 1991, pages 21-54
13 The concept of the evolutionary rebirth of monopolistic capitalism,
of a society of trusts and cartels within a single world "super trust" or in
other words a united world society governed from a single centre (a single
super trust). The author of this concept was K.Kautski, 1915
14 According to the Brent Wood (USA) agreement in 1944 a system of
international financial organisations was established resulting in the
American dollar becoming the leading currency in international finances. In
the 1980's this "system" was profoundly changed
15 See V.I. Lenin, collected works, vol.27, page 408
16 See also Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. S., 1981 (Statistics).
17 In the summer of 1986, the Bulgarian leader, T.Zhivkov published
what for the time was a courageous reformist article entitled the "July
Conception". It received much criticism from Mikhail Gorbachev and his
entourage since it raised questions about the leading role of the communist
party. Of course the Bulgarian leaders bowed under the pressure of
"comradely advice".
18 See Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. Appendiy.
19 Hundreds of books have been written on the subject of the
development of the Stalinist regime. Some of them give a particulary vivid
description of the essence of this process - e.g. D.Volkogonov - Stalin.
Triumph and Tragedy - 4 volumes. Moscow 1991.
20 Ludwig Von Mizes. Socialism. M., 1994. Introduction.
21 This can be seen in all of the speeches made by Mikhail Gorbachev.
For Example M.S. Gorbachev. On the process of implementing the decisions of
the XXVII congress of the CPSU and tasks connected with the advancement of
Perestroika. Moscow 1988.
22 There is no doubt the Gorbachev was frequently advised to use the
army to restore "law and order" and the status quo. Ifhe had given in to
such advice this would not only have returned the reform process to its
initial starting point but would also have caused conflicts involving the
spilling of blood.
23 At this time G. Yanaev was Vice President of the USSR. V. Pavlov was
Prime Minister and V. Kruchkov -- Head of the KGB.
24 According to a number of writers, including the last advisor the
Soviet president - Andrei Grachov, the decisive factors for the resignation
of Mikhail Gorbachev were the opinion of the Minister of Defence,
B.Shaposhnikov and his support for Boris Yeltsin. In a conversation I had in
December 1995 A.Grachov once more re-iterated his astonishment at this fact
and described it as the key factor in the collapse of the USSR.
25 The Madrid summit meeting of the member states of the EU spoke
eloquently of this. Even if the deadline for the introduction of the common
currency is postponed there is apparently no doubt of its eventual
implementation.
26 The statistics in this paragraph are taken from the Economist -
World in figures L., 1994
27 K. Marx. Das Kapital. V.1. C., 1984. P.484.
28 This was the dominant thesis of the leaders of on the leading
parties in Bulgaria -- the union of democratic forces between 1990--1993.
29 J. Grey. Liberalism. Sofia. 1991. P. 92.
30 V. Lenin. Complete Works. V. 29. P. 121.
31 These three conclusions were developed for the first time in my
books "Socialisation and democratic centralism" (1987) and "Socialism and
Self Management" (1989)".
32 A.Toffler. Forecasts and pre-conditions, Sofia, 1991, page 64
33 A.Toffler - Ibid
34 See Fortune, 1995, April, August
35 The Best Companies To Work For In America. N.Y. 1993. P. 285.
36 Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilisations? Democratic review
ed.2-3, 1995, page 167
37 Foreign Affairs, vol.72, No.4, page 16
38 A. Toffler. "The Shock of the Future". S., 1991.
39 See Creating A New History For Future Generations. Ed. By T. Him and
J. Dator. Kyoto. 1994.
40 J. K. Galbraith. The Anatomy of Power. S., 1993, p. 54.
41 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
42 Employee Ownership. National Center for Employee ownership, 1985, p.
53.
43 Calculated on the basis of "Germany's top 500", Frankfurt/Main 1995.
44 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
45 P.Drucker. Post-capitalist society. Harper, 1994, p.96
46 J.Stalin. Economic problems of the development of socialism in the
USSR (in his book, J.V.Stalin on the Socialist Economy). Sofia 1955. 47.
P.Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N.Y.,1994
47 P. Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N. Y., 1994.
48 See. H.Genov. The Path of the Dragon. Sofia, 1992.
49 L.R.Braun. K.Braun and S.Pastel. I. The Condition of the Planet (A
Picture of a Stable Society). S.1990.II. Thinking about Future Generations.
Tokyo.1994
50 R.Allen. Mathematical economics. (Russian translation) Moscow. 1963.
51 Leon Walras. Elements of Pure Economics. L.1954.
52 What I am referring to here is Marx's claim that during the
historical processes "the civil society will come again to engulf the
state". This conclusion which he came to during the period of the Paris
Commune (France 1871) was entirely ignored by the majority of his followers
and especially the founder of "real socialism".
53 Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with
responsibility for ideology during the term of Gorbachev.
54 St. Gill and D. Law. The Global political economy, p. 151.
55 UNCTAD World Investment Report. 1993.
56 The world in 1996. L., 1995, p. 113.
57 Based on statistics by M.Porter. The Competitive Advantage. N.Y.,
1990
58 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. Sofia. P. 52.
59 The Federal Reserve system fulfils the role of the central bank in
the USA. It is currently under the directorship of A.Greenspan.
60 Based on "The Economist" World in Figures, L.1994.
61 Based on the "The Economist","World in Figures" L.1994.
62 Inc. Middle East.
63 Republics of the Former Soviet Union.
64 The military balance 1994--5. UK;Brassey.
65 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. S., 1992, page 15.
??
THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
ALEXANDER TOMOV